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This study provides an answer to the complex question of why China manipulates its currency.  
The research attempts to explain how currency manipulation used as one of many tools can help 
propel a country toward modernization, but may correct for the negative effects of rapid 
development as well.  The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect of currency 
manipulation as one of many policy prescriptions for China’s economic development.  A second 
purpose of this study is to show how currency manipulation is a viable policy for China under 
current international law.  China’s currency manipulation strategy is studied from 1981-2011.  
Data was collected from the World Bank on a number of development indicators for China: Net 
development assistance received including ODA and UN assistance, trade exports, 
unemployment, and manufacturing as a percent of GDP, and gross national income.  My model 
seeks to test my argument about Chinese modernization and offers empirical support for the 
contention that China manipulates to fund its modernization.  My findings confirm my thesis: 
China manipulates its currency in order to rapidly modernize and it is not prohibited from doing 
so under international law.  These results are consistent with previous findings on export-led 
growth and currency manipulation.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 From the late 1970s to the present day China has overcome economic barriers to change 
and jumpstarted a rapid path toward modernization.  During this same time period China has also 
followed an export growth model of development which has led to the accumulation of US dollar 
reserves and a large trade surplus with many countries.  Subsequently, the large amount of US 
dollar reserves have artificially lowered the overall value of the Chinese currency.  This has 
allowed China to maintain a competitive advantage in labor and production costs which has 
increased foreign investment in the country.  Unfortunately many countries over the past twenty 
years from 1992-2012 have viewed China as a currency manipulator with the largest critic being 
the United States.  In fact, many arguments exist that claim China purposefully maintains a 
cheap currency in order to cause economic damage to other nations, maintain its advantage in 
export led growth, and keep some form of leverage over the United States.  However, this cannot 
be the path China would take when it has achieved so much since normalizing relations with the 
world since the 1980s.  Therefore, China must manipulate its currency for a reason other than a 
malevolent intention to inflict harm on other nations.  I argue China manipulates its currency to 
propel it on a path of economic modernization. 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Central banks may intervene under orders from the government to assist in stimulating 
exports by devaluing the domestic currency. In the last decade this relatively simple statement 
has forced debates within legislative bodies to reexamine their trade policies.  In September 
2010, the former finance minister of Brazil Guido Mantega claimed the world entered into a 
global currency war whereby countries manipulate their exchange rates in order to create a 
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competitive advantage over others.  One outspoken critic of currency manipulation has been the 
United States.  In fact, a recent study by Scott (2014) suggests China is to blame for the recent 
job loss during the Great Recession of 2008 and Congress must pass legislation to limit China’s 
ability to manipulate it currency, the Renminbi also known as the Yuan.  Ramirez (2013) shows 
that U.S. policymakers receive more in political action committee donations when they claim 
China is a currency manipulator.  Herrman (2010) and Staiger and Sykes (2010) have claimed 
that China’s currency manipulation is impermissible and must be dealt with through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Even during the 2012 
presidential election campaign, Mitt Romney vowed that as president he would label China a 
currency manipulator, and would levy punitive tariffs as recompense for lost manufacturing jobs.   
Significantly, the U.S. Treasury Department has the authority to annually examine the 
exchange rate policies of countries and initiate negotiations if they are found to manipulate their 
currencies.   The Treasury Department has labeled only three countries as manipulators: China 
from 1992 to 1994, Taiwan in 1988, and Japan in 1988 (Keating, 2012).  Gagnon (2012) lists 
nine countries in Asia that manipulate their currencies for explicit trade advantages: Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  Bergsten and 
Gagnon (2012) also show that currency manipulation occurs not only on a local scale between 
two countries, but on a global scale.  Unfortunately they do not explore why countries choose to 
manipulate.  Navarro (2012) claims the U.S. cannot only blame China for its economic 
misfortunes, but instead it must focus on the aggregate of countries that manipulate their 
currencies.  Overall, these previous studies make claims about currency manipulation, but 
provide little substantial empirical evidence to support their argument.  Other than for the sake of 
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trade protectionism and an export dependent model of growth, there must be other reasons why 
countries in Asia manipulate their currencies. 
Therefore, to explore what motivates exchange rate politics in Asia, this study will examine 
the justification of government intervention into the Chinese currency market.  The question 
surrounds a complex issue: is there evidence that China manipulates its currency as a tool of 
economic policy, which at the current time has led to cries of a currency war?  In order to answer 
this question this paper provides evidence of its existence.  First, this research seeks an 
understanding the use of monetary policy in a competitive devaluation environment by 
examining the recent literature.  Next I examine the economic and political justifications for 
China’s leaders to choose currency manipulation as a policy tool.  Finally, I explore international 
law to provide a legal context for why China gets away with currency manipulation.  To restate 
the argument simply, China employs currency manipulation because it is motivated by three 
factors: internal economic problems, modernization and a lack of international law.  However, 
before analyzing the internal problems of China an understanding of how countries use central 
bank policy as a tool warrants a discussion. 
1.2 Layout of Study 
This paper will lay out the reasons for China’s devaluation campaign and current currency 
manipulation.  Previous literature will show how China devalued its currency and the ways in 
which it has manipulated its currency the Renminbi.  However, these past studies do not explain 
the internal reasoning for China choosing a policy of currency manipulation.  Therefore, this 
paper remedies the situation by explaining what forces drove the Chinese toward manipulation.  
Chapter two explores the economic basis for a currency manipulation policy.  Then chapter three 
presents the theoretical framework and structural problems the Chinese government faces such as 
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high unemployment, a large educated population, and the fear of unrest.  In order for the Chinese 
government to maintain legitimacy it must provide its people with jobs.  To accomplish that task 
it chose a devaluation policy to attract foreign investment in its export sector.  Past literature on 
the subject of Chinese manipulation and international law highlights the ability of China, and any 
country in general, to manipulate its exchange rates.  Chapter four will analyze the current 
literature on Chinese currency manipulation and provide evidence for why it would choose such 
a policy.  Next, chapter five empirically analyzes the effects of currency manipulation on a 
number of domestic economic and political variables.  Finally, chapter six will discuss the 






Chapter 2. Economic Theory Background 
2.1 Understanding Foreign Exchange 
An exchange rate is defined as the act of trading or holding foreign currency (Pugel 2009).  
There are two types of exchange rate systems discussed throughout this paper: floating and fixed.  
Under a floating exchange rate the domestic currency may see appreciation, a rise in the 
exchange rate value or depreciation, a fall in the exchange rate value.  A purely floating 
exchange works without intervention from a central bank or government mandate.  To provide a 
simple example, when one country exports goods the importing country purchases the exporting 
country’s currency, which will cause an appreciation of the exporter’s currency and a 
depreciation of the importer’s currency. 
However, market forces do not always explain the differences in exchange rates.  The other 
main exchange rate system is a fixed rate regime.  Under this regime, government and central 
bank officials attempt to keep their value of their currencies fixed (pegged) to a foreign currency.  
The government will mandate a narrow band in which the currency may fluctuate, but if the 
currency moves too high or low, the central bank intervenes.  The official reduction of a nation’s 
currency by the central bank or government mandate is referred to as a devaluation; revaluation 
refers to the official increase in the value of a currency (Pugel 2009).  These devaluation and 
revaluation policies are commonly cited as currency manipulation. 
Kirshner (1995) explains currency manipulation as the simplest form of monetary policy that 
has the greatest degree of flexibility and number of applications.  Although for currency 
manipulation to be successful, a country that devalues its currency must not be manipulated 
against.  Overall states have used currency manipulation to deal with economic problems such as 
high unemployment, low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, the legitimacy of government 
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institutions and “the psychology of currency values” (Kirshner 1995, 8).  The psychology of 
currency values means nations over time have pushed for a stronger currency value for other 
than strictly economic reasons.  In particular, the value of a country’s currency may be linked 
with a government’s legitimacy.  For example, Margaret Thatcher argued that a strong pound for 
Great Britain would increase its prestige. 
2.2 Tools of Central Banks 
When a country establishes a central bank the governing authority will issue a mandate to 
follow certain policy measures such as maintaining a stable rate of inflation, operating the 
economy at full employment, or price stability.  To successfully maintain these mandates a 
central bank operates with three distinct policy tools.  First, the central bank may raise or lower 
the base interest rate.  As interest rates fall they will provide an incentive for investors to find 
other sources of income in the form of treasury bonds.  International capital flows depend on 
interest rates.  A higher interest rate will attract capital inflows, conversely; a lower domestic 
interest rate will move capital to foreign countries, provided that domestic interest rates are not 
offset by higher or lower foreign interest rates (Pugel 2009).   
Second, the central bank has the power to raise or lower the money supply.  The bank 
accomplishes this through open market operations, whereby the central bank purchases or sells 
government debt instruments through the financial markets of a country.  These operations are 
used to change short term interest rates and to raise or lower the money supply.  For example if 
the U.S. Federal Reserve purchases U.S. government securities, it does so through the Federal 
Reserve bank account, which credits the proceeds of the purchases to the seller’s account at the 
Federal Reserve.  These private banks now have additional money reserves to lend out, thereby 
7 
 
increasing the money supply.  Countries will have different targets, but operate with the same 
basic policy tools.   
Finally, intervention purchases assist governments when they attempt to control the foreign 
exchange market.  This intervention is sometimes referred to as “currency pegs, bends, and 
crawls”.  This type of intervention can also involve capital controls, a restraint in cross border 
financial transactions, when a government wishes to maintain a fixed exchange rate.  To provide 
an illustration, the domestic government purchases foreign currency at a fixed price, thereby 
increasing the value of the foreign currency and devaluing the domestic currency (Feenstra and 
Taylor 2008). 
2.3 Recent Examples of Asian Manipulation 
Japan’s Prime minister, Shinzo Abe, promised to revive the country’s economy when he took 
office in December 2012.  He called for a renewed monetary easing to reverse the effects of 
deflation Japan has suffered for the past two decades.  Japan’s central bank aimed at a two 
percent inflation target in two years and promised to keep the printing press rolling until the bank 
meets that target.  However, for Japan to reach this goal it would take a twenty five percent drop 
in the value of the Japanese Yen.  The devaluation of the Yen would lower the price of Japanese 
exports and increase Japanese net exports (Coy 2013).  In 1994, China pegged the Renminbi 
(RMB) to the U.S. dollar until 2005.  Although the currency appreciated against the dollar, China 
maintained a managed float with a basket of currencies including the U.S. dollar.  The Renminbi 
has appreciated from 8.28/1 to about 6/1 per US dollar.  However, China still pegs its currency to 
the U.S. dollar and allows fluctuations within a narrow 1 percent band.  The cheaper RMB gives 
China’s export market a competitive edge in the global market place.  Although in the past the 
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RMB appreciated against the dollar, Goldstein and Lardy (2008) and Highfill and Wojcikewych 
(2011) believe the Renminbi is still undervalued.   
 The easiest way for China and Japan to devalue their currencies is by purchasing U.S. 
treasury securities.  Since 2012, China has maintained its holdings of U.S. securities while Japan 
has steadily increased its holdings of treasury securities.  Table-1 shows the major foreign 
holders of U.S. securities from the Treasury Department.  Also the relationship of the 
Renminbi/U.S. dollar and Yen/U.S. dollar are shown in graphs one and two respectively.   The 
Charts provide visual illustrations of both the largest holders of US. Securities and the sharp pegs 
of China. 
Table 1 Major Holders of US Treasury Securities.  (Amount in US $ Billion) 
Year China Japan 
2014 1244.3 1230.9 
2013 1270.1 1182.5 
2012 1220.4 1111.2 
2011 1151.9 1058.1 
2010 1160.1 882.3 
2009 894.8 765.7 
2008 727.4 626.0 
2007 477.6 581.2 
2006 396.9 622.9 
2005 310.0 670.0 
2004 222.9 689.9 
2003 159.0 550.8 
2002 118.4 378.1 
2001 78.6 317.9 
2000 60.3 317.7 




Graph 1 China/US foreign exchange rate.  Source: Board of Governors 
 
 
 Over the past decade China has become the world largest holder of US securities.  
However, to place this policy into action would give a reason for China’s currency policy.  
Therefore, China must operate by some form of constraint or have an underlying motivation for 
this action.  The next chapter will shift through the contending theories of international relations 
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Chapter 3. Contending Theoretical Frame Works 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter there seem to be competing theories for why China 
would pursue a strategy of currency manipulation.  Three perspectives emerge as potentially 
useful for analyzing the use of Chinese monetary policy: realism, constructivism, and 
modernization.  This section will address the relevance of realism, constructivism, and 
modernization theory as it applies to Chinese currency manipulation.  It will establish the 
frameworks of each theory as well as the appropriate perspective to analyze China’s economic 
development.  Then covariation will be used to develop a testable hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between currency manipulation and the effects on China’s economic problems as the 
country modernized. 
3.1 Modernization Theory with Globalist Perspective 
 Modernization theory is defined as the social, political, and economic change arising 
from the development of industrialization and technological development.  The state maintains 
control over the use of nature which makes possible the improvements in transportation, 
communication, and mass consumption.  However, the concept of national autonomy has 
become difficult as economic activities cross borders.  Domestic and foreign policy become one 
and the same and economic and foreign policy become political; for example, devaluation of 
currency to save jobs and rescue industries is criticized by nations that are affected by this policy 
that will take action in the form of trade sanctions or other financial threats.  Modernization 
theorists believe in a cobweb image that depicts a much more complex system that defies 
national boundaries.   
 Modernization is viewed in a trajectory fashion as economic, cultural and political 
changes go together in patterns.  For example as a nation industrializes it brings increased 
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migration and urbanization; it allows for workers to begin specializing in a trade and requires 
higher levels of formal education.  However, along with this trajectory, modernization brings 
with it a series of problems such as mass political participation, unemployment, and a change in 
cultural values.  Although modernization theorists cannot predict the effects in each country or 
the response of political leaders to specific problems, what they claim is that these problems 
encountered through modernization and the reaction by government play a decisive role in 
promoting policy prescriptions. 
 Modernization theory will explain China’s rapid growth with an influence from a 
globalist perspective.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, as China began to modernize its 
economy, Beijing encountered structural problems such as unemployment, mass migration, and 
inflation.  Therefore, as China modernizes the government has made it a priority to minimize the 
damage felt to its citizens.  Although the theory has been addressed at length on a historical basis 
of political development in China, it lacks the strong theoretical backing and quantitative 
approach for a discussion on its currency policy.  When Deng Xiaoping opened up China his 
primary goal was to make modernization his top priority (fazhan shi yingdaoli).  However, to 
achieve modernization the Chinese wanted to see their country transform into an economic 
power.   
 However, Peng (2009) argues modernization may occur along different paths, but all 
proceed in a general direction.  In fact, the four modernizations instituted by Deng would fall 
into a category that holds modernization as a historical process by which less developed 
countries catch up to the advanced economies through the revolution in the framework of 
international relations after the implementation of capitalism.  In fact, if China relied on Western 
theories of economic growth it would only lead to discussions of abstract models.  Meaning 
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Western concepts do not apply to China’s economic and political development unless they take 
into account the different way of life in China which comprises a communist government, 
Confucian way of life, and dependency on the family unit not the individual.  Also, there have 
been so many theories that have come out of the fields of economics, political science, and 
history to discuss modernization, and instead of contradicting each other they only complement 
the other fields which leads to a broad multi-layered process.  
 Fangjun (2009) believes that as China passes through certain stages of modernization, the 
Chinese will continue to uphold the communist government and maintain an economy that has 
three unique Chinese characteristics.  First, the economy is not guided by capitalist impulses, but 
rather by socialist characteristics.  For Chinese modernization to proceed smoothly China must 
uphold its Marxist ideology, because modernization is crucial in creating a socialist China.  
Second, China emphasizes internal harmony; this means the government wishes to base its 
economy on an all-around development of spiritual, political, and economic forces.  Third, 
Chinese traditions makes the government focus on the people and society instead of the 
individual.  In the people’s view so long as the government and its policies do no harm to the 
general will, the people will continue to support Beijing.  For China to facilitate this type of 
modernization with Chinese characteristics, its government understands that it must keep the 
people satisfied.  In China this means finding sources of investment that can provide jobs, 
upward mobility, force the advancement of educational attainment, and generate societal wealth 
for all people.  A currency manipulation strategy will provide China with this route as businesses 
will invest more when the exchange rate risk has been reduced. 
 Wang and Junxiang (2009) would agree with this argument as they claim modernization 
is China’s main goal.  Modernization assures the Chinese government and people: national 
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independence, as well as changes for their economic industries, culture, and society.  It allows 
for the development of productive forces as the main driver in the economy which gives the 
communist government the legitimacy it desires while at the same time implementing socialist 
policies to stop any harm that may arise from these forces.  The authors argue that historically 
the many revolutions China experienced from 1840 to 1949 were meant to accomplish these 
goals.  However, a revolution was not seen as the end goal, China needed to modernize its 
economy for any revolution to be complete. 
 Overall, China has modernized its economy in recent years.  Although the theoretical 
literature touches briefly on the effects of modernization on Chinese policy prescriptions, some 
predictions can be drawn from the limited information.  First, China obviously places 
modernization of its economy and social system first.  This was recognized by Deng when he 
launched the four modernizations after assuming the Chairman position of the Communist Party.  
Second, China has not followed a traditional model of development as found in Western political 
and economic theory.  Instead China has found its own system of development which is highly 
centered on protecting the general welfare of the people and securing the legitimacy of the 
communist party.  Finally, for China to achieve such rapid modernization, it must have followed 
an alternative prescriptive model, because since 1994 China has maintained a pegged or floating 
peg to the dollar. 
 Knowing the Chinese modernization and currency prescription benefits the people, a 
question remains how is this shown?  Chang’s (2008) book, Factory Girls: From Village to City 
in a Changing China, shows the daily lives of migrant workers who come from a rural life to 
find work in a city.  Chang takes the reader into a bird’s eye view of factory life, the changing 
family relationships, how the migrant workers sleep and eat, and how there are other various jobs 
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migrant workers perform such as prostitution.  Chang’s main argument rests on the idea that 
mass immigration from villages to city life is changing Chinese society by providing jobs to the 
rural immigrants. 
   As Chang says, “In factories, restaurants, construction sites, elevators, delivery services, 
housecleaning, child-raising, garbage-collecting, barbershops, and brothels, almost every worker 
is an immigrant” (Chang 2008, 12).  Most surveys asked the migrants why they left home, and 
many responded with: “there was nothing to do at home so I went out.”  Chang describes how 
migrants fell prey to cons, and as a consequence, with minimal information they made decisions 
to leave or join a factory.  Overall Chang’s presents a vivid account of the Chinese response to 
globalization.  Most other industrialized nations like France had a hard time adjusting to the 
changing nature of economic conditions, but migrant workers in China embrace them as a 
challenge.  
 The People’s Republic of China held a Marxist philosophy like its neighbor in Russia 
when discussing the evils of capitalism.  However, the Chinese workers today, according the 
Chang do not mirror the workers in the Marxist narrative of development.  Although the workers 
on the assembly line cannot afford the goods they produce, they are not alienated from other 
people or their lives.  In fact, when Chang described how the worker’s favorite day was payday it 
reminds one of Marx’ cash nexus, “it has pitilessly torn asunder the motely feudal ties that bound 
man to his natural superiors, and has left remaining no naked self-interest, than callous cask 
payment.  It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in the place of the numberless 
indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that singe, unconscionable freedom-free trade” (Marx 
1848, 211).  However, there must be some way to examine the economic effects of 
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modernization on the Chinese state.  Instead of a Marxist approach to modernization theory I 
follow a globalist perspective.    
 The Globalist perspective posits economic issues allow for an understanding of state 
actions - domestic and international.  The importance of economic factors helps explain the 
evolution and function of the contemporary world system.  Globalists argue that in order to 
explain the behavior of a state at any level of analysis-individual, societal, and between states-
one must first grasp the overall structure of the global system within which such behavior takes 
place. Also, international relations are viewed from a historical perspective of the development 
of capitalism at this level of analysis.  An appreciation of the historical evolution of the capitalist 
system allows for a complete understanding of the current international structure. Finally, 
globalists argue that there is some mechanism of domination that exists to keep some states from 
developing.  Essentially, globalists argue four points; first, economic issues are most important; 
second, to know the current structure of the state one must recognize how capitalism developed 
within the country; third, there is a mechanism of domination that exists between states that 
prevent poorer states from developing; and fourth, it is necessary to identify the global context in 
which states interact-the actions of actors are explained by a system that provides opportunities 
and constraints (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). 
 Taken together both theory and perspective will allow for the research question about 
why China devalues its currency, to fit into what is already known in the literature review.  The 
literature review establishes arguments that fit into the modernization theoretical framework.  
First, examining China’s exchange rate policy clearly showed that in the 1930s when China 
began to join the modern industrialized economies it followed the same formula as its Western 
counterparts and helped its the economy recover from 1935-1937.  Also, Wang (2003) claims 
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China’s development will be shaped by factors including political events and world prestige and 
as Kirshner (2003) states, nations will follow policies that go against economic logic for the 
continued dominance of political legitimacy.  Finally, Zhao and Liu (2010) further the argument 
that China must constantly change its policy as it experiences interdependence with the rest of 
the world change as well.  Changing economic policy often involves a shift in diplomatic policy 
as well.  
 In the second part of the review it was discovered China has a high number of 
unemployed people from the countryside who migrate into the cities but cannot find work.  
Therefore, the government actively finds the unemployed migrants work to increase its 
legitimacy and standing among the people.  Finally, in the third section, although international 
law lays a framework against currency manipulation, China has not been brought to court due to 
the fact that international law lacks enforcement mechanisms and the Chinese claim they have 
the right to further their interests through manipulation.  Therefore, according to the previous 
scholars mentioned on Chinese modernization, an especially important theoretical framework for 
analyzing Chinese economic and political factors is modernization theory.  This theory is 
furthered by analyzing a country with a globalist outlook. 
 An argument one could make is that China’s rise to power follows the realist perspective. 
Realism’s central argument holds that human affairs are governed by four factors: 1) egoism, 
states and people are self-interested utility maximizing units; 2) anarchy, an absence of a higher 
power to keep states in check; 3) Groupism, whereby politics takes place between groups such as 
states; and 4) power centrism, where international relations concerns itself with power and 
security.  These factors make politics confrontational unless a higher power is established to 
keep them in check.  Without any such authority-anarchy- to enforce agreements, states resort to 
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force to obtain their wants and desires.  Even if states believe no other nation will retaliate today 
the states remain uncertain about the future.  Although any state might have the capability to 
strike back they remain in constant fear of each other and therefore arm themselves.  When states 
obtain the capabilities to attack and defend politics and negotiations take on a different cast.  
Disagreements that would normally resolve themselves peacefully now become conflictual 
(Wohlforth 2008).   
 More specifically, the branch of realism that best defines Chinese monetary policy given 
the findings from the literature review is neorealism.  The main difference between traditional 
realism and neorealism comes from how neorealists view conflict.  The neorealists posit that 
conflicts generate themselves through anarchy.  In the case of China, the lack of international 
law regarding currency manipulation and a lack of enforcement mechanism allow China to 
manipulate its currency.  Unlike the other scholars, neorealists hold states as functionally similar 
units, such as billiard balls on a pool table.  However, the key to understanding the security 
dilemma of states, comes from an idea that if one state gains an advantages all others lose in a 
zero-sum game situation.  Therefore, since states remain uncertain of the future and of gains 
other states may obtain, many inherently build up arms.  In our case, as China builds up a war 
chest of foreign reserves which allows for currency manipulation, other states see this as a threat 
to their national security, like the United States, who cannot turn to a higher government power 
and pass domestic legislation to try and limit their losses.  As states may use its newly obtained 
capabilities to change the balance of power.  The graph shows the makeup of Chinese reserves as 
well as the total amount.  Ironically, because the Chinese purchase U.S. government debt, they 




Graph-2 Composition of Chinese Foreign Reserves.  Source World Bank 
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 China is purposefully manipulating its currency for the sole purpose of power projection 
into the global economy.  As suggested by realists Scott (2014), Bergsten and Gagnon (2012), 
Herrmann (2010), and Gagnon (2012), who argue that as China continues to acquire a large 
amount of foreign reserves, the surplus could provide China with other investments that 
encourage economic growth such as increasing military capabilities. However to date there is no 
link between the two that would cause this monocasual factor and it only exists in theoretical 
arguments.  The trade imbalance has allowed China to train and maintain a large military force.  
From this increased military might the Chinese can "bully" anyone in its Asian theater, 
especially in the Tibet and the Xinjiang Uyghur region where China has been accused of 
violating human rights.  China has also clashed with Japan over islands and sea territory.  While 
these territorial issues with Japan have deep historical roots, the Chinese behavior with 
neighboring countries led some scholars such as Mearsheimer (2002) to wonder if China will try 
to become a regional or global hegemon as to maximize its prospects of survival.  Moreover, the 
growing Chinese military power compared to shrinking American power causes some to worry 
that the US might indeed lose its hegemonic status to China.  The importance here rests on the 
assumption by realists that although China manipulates its currency it only does so for the 
increased military capabilities and for power projection.  This realist argument does not view 
currency manipulation as a problem but rather as an unintended consequence of a rising power 
that must be accepted by all. 
 Also, Mearsheimer (2014) analyzed the rise of China and questioned whether China 
could rise peacefully.  Mearsheimer has two concerns regarding China; the first comes from the 
phrase, never forget national humiliation (wuwang guochi), which has led China to evolve from 
nationalism into hyper-nationalism whereby the Chinese are constantly reminded of the defeats 
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by Western countries, the constant warring states, and collapsed governments from the 1800s 
until the 1860s.  Mearsheimer points out the United States and China are not as economically 
interdependent as other scholars believe and if China or the United States needed to find any 
reason to attack each other, they would turn toward a policy of economic containment, which 
would be costly to both sides.  Overall both states would allow it because states in general value 
security over prosperity.  Although Mersheimer didn’t mention the phrase in his article, Deng 
Xiaoping said,: “Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with fears calmly, hide our 
capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” 
(Leng jing guan cha, zhan wen jiao gen, chen zhuo ying fu, tao guang yang hui, shan yu shou 
zhuo, jue bu dang tou) (US Government Printing Office 2009).  In fact, this quote provides the 
realists with a solid backing for their point of view of power projection.  However, realists do not 
equate the concept of currency manipulation as a strategy, but rather as an externality. 
 Unfortunately realism cannot explain why China would pursue a currency manipulation 
strategy.  First, realism does not take into account the different cultures of different states.  For 
example democracies do not go to war with one another and are more likely to cooperate; the 
same can be said for states that hold the same religion.  Realism takes into account only military 
capabilities and not the advantages of economic capabilities as in its view without security there 
can be no prosperity.  Also, trade has taken on a more useful role for development and conflict 
than military capabilities.  For one nation to propose a subsidy or quota would start a trade war 
and violate the World Trade Organization (WTO) laws.  If one nation wanted to destroy another, 
the interconnection from trade would turn into a self-defeating prophecy.  Although realism 
might explain why China has developed a large military force and perhaps shed light on factors 
behind the large buildup of foreign reserves, it cannot explain why China would pursue a policy 
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of currency manipulation for reasons other than conflict prevention and power projection.  In 
fact, if China’s policy led to conflict then somewhere between the sharp devaluation in 1994 and 
today there would be some form of conflict whether militarily or trade related.  However, at the 
present time such a conflict has not come to fruition and only exists in the minds of realists. 
 However some scholars such as Womack (2012) and Zhao and Liu (2010) believe China 
may follow a constructivist approach to its exchange rate policy.  The Constructivist school 
places an emphasis on the social creation of interests, the connection between a structure and 
agent, and it believes in different levels of anarchy.  Unlike realism which believes states 
respond to material concerns, constructivists believe national interests consist of a social and 
relational construction of their needs.  More generally, they intend that there are social meanings 
attached to objects and practices.  Constructivists understand that ideas hold symbolic meanings, 
which remain in the collective memories of people, the processes of government, the curriculum 
in schools and educational systems, and in the intent of state affairs.  Constructivism believes 
that material forces are only understood through social concepts that define the meaning of 
human actions (Hurd, 2008).  Wendt (1992) explains constructivism as the actions people have 
toward objects and other people are based on conceptual meanings of these objects.  In essence 
the world is understood through an individual’s defined meaning of people, places, and things.  
For example from an American viewpoint, five North Korean nuclear warheads are more 
dangerous than the five hundred British nuclear weapons (Wendt 1995).  Here it clearly shows 
the American viewpoints are constructed by their understood meanings to both North Korea and 
Great Britain.  This statement is also a rejection of realist logic which would state Britain is more 
dangerous than North Korea based on its military capabilities.  
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 Constructivism rests upon four premises.  First, it is viewed as an alternative to 
materialism denoted as people’s actions take on a different web of meanings and these ideas can 
change over time.  Second, state interests are constructed through the collective memories of 
those in charge of government and statecraft.  In fact, foreign policy goals and objectives are 
only shaped by the perceived dominant ideas of a society.  Third, there remains a construction of 
state actors and institutions.  A state’s action or response to another will contribute to an overall 
understanding of how two countries will interact in the future.  Norms and institutions only exist 
to influence states into accepting the dominant norms of international life.  Finally fourth, 
constructivists believe in different concepts of anarchy.  As Wendt (1992) titled it, anarchy is 
what states make of it.  Constructivism believes that if a nation holds itself to a norm or binding 
enforcement of an international structure, then anarchy does not exist as realist believe because it 
would not be in a nation’s best interest to follow such ideas. In fact, constructivists only believe 
anarchy is an explanatory variable in the equation of realists in that the actions of states originate 
from how they interact with each other.  In effect, anarchy just explains how some states behave 
toward others.  
 From constructivist theory it can be learned that states are motived by their collective 
wills that may see the world differently than a competitor.  Constructivists have given 
international relations theory the ability to view that status, prestige, hegemony, and reputation 
all come from a shared understanding of the global community.  In fact, Wang (2003), Kirshner 
(2003), Womack (2013), and Zhao and Liu (2010) believe China’s currency policy reflects an 
aspiration to become a “responsible great power” and as a rising power the need for international 
prestige increases as well.  Also, how China views itself as a great power will differ from other 
nations’ viewpoints of great powers.  Already in the collective minds of the populace in China 
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are the words “Never forget national humiliation: Recreate the Glory” (Wuwang guochi: 
zaichuang huihuang) (Callahan 2006, 126).  This simple quote explains how the Chinese will 
interact with the rest of the world.  They will not forget the humiliation of the opium wars and 
the social revolution and will rebuild the glorious empire of old with modern technology.  China 
might believe that a currency policy which could increase trade and make China the envy of the 
world might be in its best interests. 
 However, constructivism has limitations when looking at the Chinese case.  First, if 
anarchy is what states make of it, there may remain different levels of constructivism or even 
different levels of abstraction when analyzing cases.  Also with so much attention paid to the 
emphasis on materialism, the perspective misses out on the development of the state.  If a state 
develops through foreign investment the question becomes the following: do material interests 
motivate the country to change or does another country motivate China to change against its 
will?  Also constructivism does not pay attention to policy needs on how to solve domestic 
problems.  Rather the theory only provides research with a description of how the country 
operates and responds, but not how to solve domestic or foreign problem.  Therefore, a theory to 
describe Chinese policy must take into account some form of prescriptive policy as opposed to a 
descriptive theory on how China behaves.  
 For China’s monetary policy to operate on the level of a constructivist viewpoint, then 
somewhere along its past history the country would have viewed monetary policy as irrelevant or 
as merely a useful tool.  To analyze China’s monetary policy from a constructivist viewpoint 
would miss out on its past and modern history influencing the government decision to 
manipulate its currency.  Also, it would miss out on the influence of other countries and their 
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viewpoints on China’s manipulation strategy since currency manipulation in constructivist theory 
would be regarded as how states hold symbolic meaning to their currency values.  
3.2 A Multi-Level Analysis  
 To look at China, one cannot rely on only one level of analysis.  For China development 
was spurred by capitalist tendencies during the late 1800s from Western civilization.  This means 
to analyze China one must look at elements within the country as well as international elements.  
From here on China began to modernize through foreign exploitation.  Additionally, China 
experienced foreign exploitation until the communist government took control in 1949.  Only in 
the 1980’s after relations were normalized with the rest of the world did China essentially 
resume the same model of growth, an export oriented economy through foreign exploitation of 
workers.  However, China encountered a number of domestic problems such as unemployment 
and migration.  However to fix these problems China turned outward to rely on foreign 
investment in the form of building factories and infrastructure through foreign investment which 
it borrowed from Japan.  For China to continue this policy of reliance on foreign aid it needed a 
policy to maintain a competitive advantage over its rivals. China chose a currency policy that 
would lower the cost of labor and give investors lower risk because they could better predict 
profits with an explicit pegged currency.  Of course international law has not prevented China 
from conducting these operations, yet they rely on the capitalist system as it has developed in 
China over the past two hundred years to fix its domestic problems.  To understand why China 
would pursue a currency manipulation policy, one must recognize that China relies not only on 
domestic politics, but on the international system as well.  Therefore, the mixture of 
modernization theory with a globalist perspective is appealing when analyzing China. 
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 Correspondingly, there remain some limitations when using one analytical perspective 
over another.  Klein et al. (1994) discuss some limitations when using different levels of 
analysis.  The theoretical framework of analysis may arouse confusion and controversy as 
scholars may discuss problems and solutions at different meanings from abstract to very specific 
and concrete; however, these analyses also offers insight into how states behave.  In fact, the 
nature of states is multilevel in today’s interdependent world.  Within a state resides individuals 
who in turn form group coalitions, who then use these group ideas to interact with other 
likeminded groups.  These groups may be domestic or foreign like a state, corporation, or 
nongovernmental organization.  There is in fact no way for a group or individual to be insulated 
from different levels of organization. 
3.3 Understanding Unit-Level and Systemic Analysis 
 To further illustrate why this study warrants a multi-level analysis, both unit-level and 
systemic level analysis needs to be discussed.  States are actors who not only seek domination 
over land, goods, and other states directly, but they seek to construct a framework of institutions 
that will allow them to reach their objectives.  The primary unit of international relations focuses 
on states whether it is to dissect the internal units of a country or to examine its relationship with 
others.  States also face problems both internationally and domestically; however when finding 
solutions for both international and domestic problems the lines between foreign and domestic 
policy become blurred as explained with modernization theory.  Taken separately unit level and 
systemic level analysis cannot provide a complete answer but combined they can provide a 
myriad of answers.  
 For an explanation of the two levels of analysis Keohane (1984) provides an overview.  
Systemic analysis allows for an description of an outside-in approach, where state behavior is 
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determined by the attributes of the system.  Unit-level analysis on the other hand looks into a 
country to locate the source of behavior to the economic system, attitudes of political leaders, 
and the culture of the people. Of course, Keohane points out any theory “will take into account 
the distinctive characteristic of actors as well as of the system itself” (Keohane 1984, 25).   
However the systemic level regards the attributes of a country as constant rather than as variable. 
Unfortunately for systemic level observers the characteristic of a country may change over time.  
For example if China had unemployment, migration, and inflation under control, would it pursue 
the same policy?  Of course a unit level of analysis leads a researcher to miss the “context of 
action: the pressure exerted on all states by competition among them” (Keohane 1984, 25).  
Again if currency manipulation only cured domestic problems then why would China concern 
itself with keeping a competitive advantage over other countries or agreeing to international 
standards?  Furthermore, a multi-layered analysis provides an answer to China’s behavior when 
change in the conditions of the system bring effects down to the unit-level.  When the financial 
crisis of 2008 had an impact on China it not only altered its export market, but also its internal 
factors such as migration.  Likewise, mass migration caused unemployment which led the 
government to seek investments in new factories and to hire new workers, but it was unable to 
due to the systemic change.  To separate changes at the systemic and unit levels leaves out 
details that could more parsimoniously explain a situation.     
 What distinguishes my argument from traditional approaches to analyzing political and 
economic events in China are the effects of both international norms and domestic issues on state 
behavior.  Compared to the realist and constructivist assumptions, this approach will focus on the 
interaction between powers, global image, domestic concerns, and international norms, as they 
all play an integral part in explaining why a country would adopt a policy prescription that would 
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fix both foreign and domestic concerns.  Modernization theory captures these interactions and is 
combined with a globalist outlook which claims the actions taken by China are explained by the 
economic system in which they operate.   In fact according to Rousseau (1985), a multilevel 
analysis will “specify patterns of relationships replicated across levels of analysis” (Rousseau, 
1985, 25).  Finally, other scholars of Chinese development will argue that mixing a globalist 
outlook with modernization theory will lead to complementary results as studies of 
modernization tend to encompass studies of globalization and vice versa (Jiafeng, 2009). 
3.4 Theory of Chinese Historical Modernization with a Policy Prescription 
 To understand why Chinese modernization theory does requires different analysis, one 
must first learn how China developed and why it chose an export oriented trade policy which 
would make currency manipulation as a policy prescription to achieve a number of development 
goals more likely.  Scholars on Chinese modernization such as: Wang (2003), Wang and 
Junxiang (2009), Fangjun (2009), and Peng (2009) agree that a Western idea of modernization, 
with a one size fits all progressive stages, does not apply to China.  As discussed in the section 
on Chinese modernization theory, China followed its own path to modernization in order to seek 
overall harmony, putting people first, and giving legitimacy to the communist government with 
its socialist policies for economic growth.  Also, it was argued China has followed the one 
direction toward a modernized society, but has found there are multiple paths to achieve this 
goal.  In fact a Chinese modernization theorist Luo Rongqu made famous the thesis statement of 
“one direction with multiple paths in history” (yiyuan duoxian lishiguan) (Jiafeng 2009, 72). 
 Overall, the argument made at the beginning of the paper holds that China uses currency 
manipulation as a policy prescription to enable rapid modernization, but to also correct for 
negative spillover effects such as unemployment, inflation, and lack of investment.  In the 
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literature review it summarized the theories surrounding China’s modernization.  To restate the 
other important arguments as it applies to the case presented in this paper.  First, China is not 
following a currency manipulation strategy for export competiveness alone, but for other factors 
such as prestige, employment, and government legitimacy.  Second, currency manipulation is 
designed to achieve not only modernization, but an overall increase in the quality of the life of 
citizens which will improve Chinese society overall.  An increased demand for jobs arising from 
increased foreign investment will create a demand for higher level work that only an educated 
person can fulfill.  Third, modernization theory in China, must be understood through the 
historical context of Chinese development which shows that political and social revolutions in 
China were only meant to advance its economy.   
 Finally, the lens of globalization helps to explain Chinese modernization.  Globalization 
will stress the importance of economic development while modernization will address how 
China came to its place in the world and what steps it took to reach it.  Also, while China 
modernized its society it took steps to become more Westernized than some scholars would like 
to agree on. China is a member of the United Nations (UN) and WTO, which means China also 
abides by the rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Therefore China is using currency 
manipulation in despite of joining international organizations that prohibit any form of 
manipulation.  However, China has chosen a policy prescription that defies economy logic and 
international constraints.  At this stage in China’s policy it is expected to see the downward 
spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor and rapid inflation with the enormous loss of purchasing power; 
however these negative effects are not visible today.  In essence for China to accomplish its goal 
of economic, political, and societal development within the constraints of the global trading 
system, currency manipulation is the only viable option. 
29 
 
 To conclude this section an analysis of Chinese historical development from 1840-
present, placed within the theory of modernization and a globalist perspective will explain why 
currency manipulation is the only viable policy.  China’s historical economic development will 
shed light on why it chose a devaluation policy to modernize rapidly and as the globalists posit 
this will help to explain its economic relationship with other countries, in this case the United 
States.  Cohen (2010) traces Chinese development using modernization theory with a globalist 
perspective.  Cohen’s structures his thesis around major events that took place in China and how 
the U.S. responded to those events.  In the early years of Chinese modernization 1840-1860, 
Cohen pays particular attention to the Chinese unequal treatment of the treaty system for opening 
up China to Western trade.  As China was humiliated in its two opium wars and other battles in 
between 1839 and 1949, China felt it had embarrassed itself and future generations, as the 
Western nations forced China to abandon its traditional world view of the middle kingdom and 
adopt new Western ideas.  The idea of this embarrassment continues through today and will 
provide information on the current relationship between U.S. and China, as China is focused on: 
“never forget national humiliation” (wuwang guochi).   In these early years, 1860-1890, the 
Sino-U.S. relationship was perceived by the United States that using China would give it an 
advantage over other countries in international manufacturing.  Also, as the U.S. found it 
relatively easy to cooperate with the European powers on negotiating trade deals, China also 
found it stress-free to follow a path of cooperation as it provided the country with much needed 
investment.   The United States influence in East Asia at this time cannot be overstressed.  As the 
United States emerged as an industrial power it believed the modernization of China was in its 
best interests.  This would lead to U.S. commercial interests lobbying the government for 
involvement in East Asian affairs, and it would open a new market and increase U.S. growth.  
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This time from 1840-1930 may be referred to as Western imperialism which blanketed all 
activities in China such as cultural, economic, and political activates..  However, this term used 
as a perspective for China becomes meaningless as it does not stress the fact that the Chinese 
traditional economy focuses on agriculture and is hostile to merchants, this is especially true 
when combined with the internal problems that limited the economic development and growth 
potential of China.  In fact, this imperialism should be viewed as a jump starting force that 
propelled China toward modernization and now many Western nations were dedicated to the 
overall welfare of China (Vohra 1992). 
 Ever since the 1860’s the Chinese people devoted themselves to modernization through 
numerous leaders, experiments, and ideas.  The U.S. at the same time became an Asian power 
and informed the other Western nations the U.S. had an equal role in the exploitation of China 
through America’s open door policy.  Even in these early negotiations, the U.S. followed a 
realist viewpoint and yielded to commercial impulses to secure China as an economic 
opportunity.  From the exploitation of China a number of reforms took place especially among 
the military and education spheres.  The Chinese military adopted Western technologies, tactics, 
and military academics, along with a new modern army which became a symbol of national 
patriotism and nationalism.  In education policy the government from 1895-1911 created a 
hierarchy of schools at the primary, middle, and university levels.  Also the new reforms 
established courses in Western modern subjects as well as classical subjects.  Thanks to these 
reforms China’s trade increased 350 percent from 1900-1930 (Vohra 1992, 116).  In fact, 
China’s overall trade changed from importing opium to now importing raw commodities for 
refinement and development like cotton, paper, machinery, and electrical supplies, 
telecommunication, and scientific technology.  These imports reflected the trend that China was 
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moving toward a modern economy.   Also, the country experienced changes in export policy as 
well which clearly showed that China was at the transition stage between a traditional economy 
and a modern one.  The old traditional methods of production by handwork had lost to 
production by machinery and modern techniques.  Similarly, China’s industry began to extract 
more materials and from 1912-1929 industry grew at 13.8 percent per year, mostly with help by 
foreign investors.  By 1933, the industrial sector which consisted of factories employed 73 
percent of the labor force (Vohra 1992, 117).  Of course the U.S. had changing viewpoints on 
how to accommodate China into its overall Asian strategy.  Cohen (2010) states three president’s 
viewpoints during the first part of the twentieth century, Roosevelt followed a militarism style of 
leadership towards China, and Taft believed in dollar diplomacy by providing loans to develop 
Chinese industries.  Roosevelt and Taft differed however, from Wilson’s view of no cooperation 
with the imperialists in China.  
 From 1928-1937 China rapidly developed along the modernization path. Of course, the 
lifestyle was a blend of a similarly Western culture in the urban areas and the traditional life in 
the rural areas which encompassed the majority of the population.  However, in the cities the 
natives spoke English, dressed in Western clothing, and used modern devices like bathtubs, 
telecommunications, and conducted business with Western banks.  However, a problem 
remained that people in the developed cities were tied to the West, but in the countryside the 
villages still clung to a traditional lifestyle that would have major implications in the next 
decade.  Despite the positive gains from modernization the two separate lifestyles led to slow 
growth because it was only the costal port cities that were tied to trade and governmental policies 
only benefited those who lived in those urban areas.  The Nationalist Government did not focus 
on the problems of rural China, which eventually led to its downfall.  In summary China during 
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this process of modernization lacked a balanced system needed to bring the people into a modern 
society.  Unfortunately from the 1930s onwards the U.S. only maintained minimal investment in 
China and started to invest in Japan which emerged as the economic superpower of the region.  
 From here the U.S. supported the Chinese nationals only after diplomacy failed between 
the Nationalists and Communists.  When Mao Zedong took power and founded the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, he believed China should follow its own path to modernization.  Mao 
believed that since agriculture was the foundation of the economy, it should serve as the base for 
a modern economy.  The peasants were given their own plots of land, but they were usually so 
small that neither agricultural growth nor modernization succeeded (Vohra 1992, 194-195).  In 
fact, under Mao a number of measures were enforced to persecute, exile, and kill the “brain 
workers” of China; anyone who disagreed with the communist government or ideals were 
singled out from schools, intellectuals, doctors, writers, and artists.  Unfortunately, attaching too 
much emphasis to agriculture led to disruptions in the PRC coupled with a strict communist 
lifestyle of equal wages for all propelled this modernization to ruin and ended up costing China a 
series of revolutions.  Of course, that’s not to say China failed miserably at attempting to 
modernize.  It did receive help from the Soviet Republic which paid out a five year plan with an 
emphasis on industry and transportations/communications.  In fact, as China followed a path 
toward agriculture modernization and Russia invested in a China for industrial modernization it 
led to a contradiction in policy formation.   
 When the U.S. realized communist China had received support from the Soviet Union, it 
began to follow a policy of containment.  Which launched the U.S. into wars with Korea and 
Vietnam for protection for its territories.  The U.S. policy turned to “the goal of American policy 
should be to prevent the Soviet domination of China for strategic ends” (Cohen 2010, 180).  
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Eisenhower built military bases because Cohen points out “Having promised in the Republican 
Party platform of 1952 that he would end the neglect in the Far East” (Cohen 2010, 199).  In 
essence, the Americans opposed China as a proxy to fight the Soviet Union.  In fact, Cohen 
points out that perceptions and misperceptions of Soviet involvement in China provided the 
majority of U.S. responses to China.  However, on February 21, 1972 under the advice of his 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon visited China to meet Mao Zedong in order 
to restore relations and try to win back its long time economic partner from the Soviet Union.  
Unfortunately, Mao died in 1976 and would never see the normalization of relations between 
China and the United States.   
 From 1976 to 1978, China went through two leaders before Deng Xiaoping took power 
over the Peoples Republic of China, although he was not elected to party chair or premier on the 
State council.  One of Deng’s first orders of business was to bring the country together and so he 
ended the exile of “brain workers” to help in the modernization of China.  Also, foreign culture, 
movies, books, and music began being imported into the PRC.  Many foreigners, particularly 
Americans, were interested to see the Chinese mainland and the tourism industry of China began 
to develop which led to an increase the numbers of Chinese who would learn the English 
language to find a job.  After Deng’s successes on mainland China for domestic issues, the 
people began to see him as the leader of the country.  However, Deng was also concerned with 
international affairs from the time he took office.  He knew that China must modernize if it 
wanted to play a significant role in international affairs.  
 For Deng to realize his goal of Chinese modernization, Beijing began to make efforts to 
secure foreign loans, technology, machinery, and foreign businesses and investors to grow 
Chinese economic enterprises. China also sent students and scholars to Western schools to gain 
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scientific, mathematic, engineering, technology, and managerial skills.  Deng and the economic 
reformers of China pledged to allow market forces to control the production, planning, and 
pricing of commodities, except for energy and steel which Beijing believed were of national 
interest.  Of course this left China in the hands of extremists who wanted to dismantle the state 
control and party system in order to replace it with a Western modernized model.   
 Understanding the mistakes of the past hundred years, the Chinese reformers began to 
modernize the rural areas as well since the majority of the population still lived in villages.  The 
government contracted out areas of land, water, and forests for the villagers to become 
specialized units of production.  The average agricultural output grew at a rate of 6.2 percent 
from 1979-1988 which translated into an increase from 170 billion Renminbi to 587 billion 
Renminbi (Vohra 1992, 263).  This major overhaul of village life led to rural areas developing 
light service and industries which ended up absorbing the surplus rural labor that could not find 
work in the urban areas. The success from 1979-1990 encouraged China’s economic 
liberalization and government officials knew China had to keep reforming.  As China begin to 
modernize it was faced with the disaster at Tiananmen Square, the controversy of Taiwan, and 
the growth in Chinese military and economic power.   The Chinese even turned to the U.S. as a 
counterweight toward the Soviet Union, an example of realist behavior displayed by the Chinese. 
In the 1990s China gained the capabilities to play a game of tit-for-tat with the United States.  
Cohen claims, “Giving China’s great capacity for jeopardizing American interests around the 
world, it was essential to develop a good working relationship, for the two governments to be 
able to accept their differences, cooperate when possible, and avoid confrontation” (Cohen 2010, 
257).   
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 Today, China enters a world governed by economic policy.  China formats its agenda to 
maintain its image of a trusted partner in trade and military relations.  However, China has 
become very modernized in the past thirty years.  One only needs to look at the special economic 
zone of Shenzhen to clearly understand the rapid modernization.  Shenzhen was an experiment 
conducted by the Communist Party on a liberalized market.  This small town turned into a 
manufacturing hub for China and in terms of development it is equal to Hong Kong.  However, 
the question remains how did China accomplish this task and keep a rapid growth rate?  
Currency manipulation provides the answer.  I argue that China not only manipulated its 
currency to achieve export growth, but to also propel itself to a modernized economy.  From 
1981-1994 China kept a slow devaluation of its currency, while it at the same time experienced 
rapid inflation.  To counteract this it followed a monetarist policy that kept in tune with its 
reform movement of moving government out of the market.  Under the new monetary policy 
form 1994-2005 China devalued its currency and maintained a sharp peg against the dollar at 
roughly 8.3 RMB/dollar.  From 2005-presnt China has allowed for its currency to revalue to 
roughly 6 RMB/Dollar.  I believe this purposeful devaluation was not only meant to increase 
exports as some scholars have argued, but instead to continue to modernize the Chinese economy 
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 This review analyzes previous investigations into Chinese monetary policy decisions 
among three areas; China’s exchange rate policy, Chinese domestic problems, and international 
law.  This literature review summarizes devaluation within the concept of Chinese image of a 
responsible great power and how the Chinese perceive its situation with the rest of the world. I 
will observe China’s exchange rate policy from 1980 to the present.  By, exploring how China 
views itself in relation to the global economy it will allow for an appreciation of why China 
might or might not choose a devaluation policy.  Finally, an investigation of international law 
will show how the IMF and WTO discourage currency manipulation.  
4.1. China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
 First, an analysis of competitive devaluation will explain why China may choose a 
manipulation strategy to continue its economic growth.  Ahamed (2011) makes a reference to the 
1930s depression and subsequent currency devaluations and what is perceived as today’s 
currency war between China and the United States.  Frieden (2006) provides a historical 
background on the 1930’s devaluations showing the negative outcomes associated with a global 
currency war.  Both identify the reasons a country would pursue a manipulation strategy.  Also, a 
managed currency not attached to any agreement makes monetary policy an effective tool for 
combating inflation and maintaining price stability.  Both authors stress the need for government 
leaders to fix its economies first as to avoid uncertainty.  From 1929 to 1934 a total of 37 
national banking crisis occurred in the industrialized economies.  In June 1933 sixty six countries 
sent representatives to fix the international financial system during the World Economic 
Conference.  However, when the new U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt assumed office, he 
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made it clear he would get the U.S. economy growing again and international relations would 
come second (Ahamed 2011). 
 President Roosevelt in 1934 followed Great Britain which went of the gold standard in 
1931.  This seemed as if America and the rest of the developed world entered into a beggar-thy-
neighbor strategy.  The term “beggar-thy neighbor” refers to Adam Smith’s (1776:2012) 
interpretations of mercantilist economies which taught nations that “their interests consisted in 
beggaring all their neighbors” and “Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye 
upon the prosperity of all other nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain its own 
loss” (Smith 2012, 484).   
 Overall, the concept of beggar-thy-neighbor means that trade through which the liberals 
would consider as a sign of friendship turns into hostility as each nation attempts to gain 
advantages over each other for a potential monopoly in trade goods.  Both Great Britain and the 
United States paved the way for price increases, tariffs, and a reversal of globalization.  In fact, 
Roosevelt economic advisors strongly believed in a devaluation policy, as a middle ground 
solution between self-containment and philanthropic internationalism.  According to Rosen 
(2005, 24), internationalism allowed a country to focus on domestic worries because it 
understood national problems as “the consequences of skewed relationships among various 
sections, classes, and economic groups, agriculture and industry.”   Although internationalism 
focused on trade with industrialized nations, during an economic crisis, trade must concede itself 
to domestic concerns: “A return to international priorities could be achieved only after each 
nation attainted internal recovery, a position reinforced by John Maynard Keynes” (Rosen 2005, 
24).  This new policy advocated returning to international agreements only if they aided the 
country in strengthening its economy.  Rosen (2005) discovered England for the past 100 years 
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practiced internationalism and this had been a British idea to control the British economy.  
Roosevelt even denounced the idea of currency stabilization as the “old fetishes of so-called 
international bankers” (Ahamed, 2011). 
 Fortunately, Roosevelt’s rejection for international cooperation and his decision to 
devalue the dollar turned out as one of the few policy solutions that began to end the Great 
Depression by giving U.S. goods a competitive advantage in exports at the expense of other 
countries.  This devaluation allowed the Federal Reserve Bank to inject liquidity into the U.S. 
banking system thereby loosening credit.  This led to a reverse in deflationary pressures and 
increases in spending by households and businesses.  Worldwide each country continued to gain 
advantages over others by devaluing its currency after leaving the gold standard. This expansion 
of the money supply was designed to boost prices, inflation, and spending, even while the U.S. 
endured accusations of currency manipulation.  The question remains as to whether the 
international financial system experiences the same devaluation today.  There seem to be many 
resemblances between the devaluations of the 1930s and today’s accusations of a currency war.   
However, Ahamed (2011) believes China is not following the same pattern of devaluation policy 
after the 2008 crisis.  The response to China’s further devaluation would have heard cries from 
other countries accusing the Peoples Republic of stealing jobs.  Even Zhao and Liu (2010) make 
the claim the world is more interdependent today than in the 1930s.  Therefore, the idea of a 
zero-sum game and beggar-thy-neighbor policies would only lead to a crisis in China and other 
countries if they attempted the scale of devaluation to match the Great Depression.   
 However, the first example of Sino-American devaluation occurred during the 1930’s.  
China experienced a rapid modernization trend for an emerging economy.  With the growth of 
infrastructure and industry, Japan invaded, seeking resources to fight World War Two.  Kirshner 
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(1995) investigates the role of Sino-American cooperation of currency manipulation in the form 
of a devaluation.  In fact, the same concept of devaluation as described by Frieden (2006) was 
employed by China during its war with Japan with the aid of the U.S. and Great Britain.  His 
China case provides an explicit example of currency warfare.  The main actors mirror today’s 
current case: China and the United States.  In 1931, Japan invaded China’s Manchurian province 
instigating a war that lasted until 1945.  Japan knew the only way to win against China was to 
make the Chinese currency seem illegitimate.  China based its currency on the silver standard, 
but unfortunately the 1934 “American Silver Purchases Act” placed pressure on the Chinese’s 
monetary system.  As the price of silver rose, the Chinese people quickly converted their 
currency into silver and subsequently into gold which resulted in a currency shortage.  As a 
result China left the silver standard in 1935 opting for paper notes which was in a managed float 
between the U.S. dollar and British pound.  To accomplish this float, the Chinese needed a 
stabilization fund in order to intervene during daily operations.  The Chinese Finance minister 
H.H. Kung believed, “a stable exchange rate and sound uniform currency throughout China 
would provide an important stabilizing influence on the political situation.  The slide of China’s 
silver resources appeared to be the only way to raise the exchange necessary to operate such a 
fund” (Kirshner 1995, 52).  Therefore, China entered into an agreement with the U.S. whereby 
under Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. the U.S. would purchase Chinese silver.  This 
policy effectively devaluated the Chinese Renminbi, expanded credit, and increased U.S. 
influence over China’s economy.  After World War II the Nationalist government was an active 
participant in the Bretton Woods agreement.  However, China would be engulfed by civil war 
between the Communist and Nationalist and from here until 1979, the U.S. did not engage with 
China regarding monetary policy.   
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 Deng Xiaoping introduced the four modernizations into the Chinese economy in the late 
1970s.  China moved from a central planning commission to socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.  A combination of market forces and planning would allow the government to 
better control economic activity. Chinese policy today follows a concept of a “responsible great 
power” (fu zeren de daguo).  For China to act as a responsible country would allow it to elevate 
its status to a great power.  This will place pressure on Chinese officials to follow international 
norms and become a cooperative player in the international system.  In fact Wang (2003) argues 
China’s future monetary policy decisions will be shaped by political factors, prestige, and 
reputation with the rest of the world.  As a responsible great power, Chinese officials would 
follow policies that might not be in their best interests or in response to economic logic.   
 Economic logic only shows that China followed a devaluation strategy to increase 
exports.  However, it doesn’t support the conclusion that politics plays an important role.  
Without politics it seems as if economic theory only equates to policy prescriptions.  However, 
economic theory explains little about China’s chosen policy of export led growth.  As Kirshner 
(2003) states, “The indeterminacy of economic theory as a guide to policy goes much deeper 
than issues relating to the international use of money-it reaches down to the very core of 
macroeconomics, to the management and control of money” (Kirshner 2003, 7).  Investigating 
China’s political concerns will show the numerous policy problems devaluation could solve such 
as unemployment.  Chinese leaders in favor of undervaluing the RMB are driven by political 
calculations: “Since states have concerns for power and autonomy, the choice of one policy over 
another is likely to be driven by political rather than economic calculation” (Kirshner 2003, 12).  
In fact, these policy prescriptions come from constructed national interests such as having the 
continued need for a strong currency.  As Kirshner continues to point out, when beliefs become 
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an ideology that resist change even with a preponderance of evidence to the contrary, it will 
change the ways in which policy makers respond to a problem.  Second, an understating of 
acceptable behavior within the international community will constrain a state’s ability to 
formulate policy.  Finally, if a prescription works it creates a self-conforming ideology that the 
winners are correct on grounds of theoretical soundness, however the distributional effects make 
these prescriptions “political in origin and effect” (Kirshner 2003, 15). 
 Therefore following this logic there might be certain underlying factors that would cause 
Chinese leaders to change a policy prescription to fix their political problems.  Fixing a number 
of issues, fears of recession, reduction in trade competitiveness, and inflation as described by 
Hurst and Sorace (2011) and Nair and Sinnakkannu (2010), would give the government 
legitimacy and authority to solve future problems.  Also, if China wants to act as a benevolent 
power it must not take actions that would harm other nations.  Economic theory claims China’s 
devaluation is part of a beggar-thy-neighbor policy solution.  This policy holds a country will 
follow a dangerous path to a zero sum game outcome.  However, why would China follow such 
a path if it meant tarnishing its reputation among the international community?  In past economic 
dialogues with China, former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed that Chinese 
currency manipulation was a "dangerous dynamic of competitive non-appreciation which will 
lead to serious disasters in the world market."  The Chinese trade ministers responded to all 
accusations as "Nonsense, this is a purely market driven investment behavior that could be 
beneficial to us both" (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2010). 
 Womack (2013) argues China is following a win-win economic policy strategy.  As 
China began to modernize its economy, policymakers had to adjust their domestic development 
policy to accept the changes brought about by economic globalization.  However, maintaining 
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China’s policy of a responsible great power meant increasing its overall prestige within the 
global community.  Womack’s overall argument claims, “the current era of global economic 
uncertainty, combined with the remarkable increase in China’s relative capacities, make credible 
reassurance from China more important to its partners for their mutual benefit” (Womack 2003, 
912).  China’s fear of uncertainty comes from the financial crisis of 2008, which was the first 
crisis of the globalized world.  Since the 1980s most crises were regionally contained to one or a 
few local countries; however, these past crises did not harm the stability of the global system.  
Today, “caution becomes the global watchword” (Womack 2003, 916).  The 2008 crisis showed 
the limits of China’s ability to control its political and economic sustainability.  As the global 
economy slows down so does China’s growth which places pressures on the government to 
alleviate any problems arising from any future crisis.   
 An undervalued currency will help alleviate these problems by increasing Chinese 
exports relative to other industrialized countries (Nair and Sinnakkannu 2010).  For any state to 
maintain its legitimacy it must have a given level of certainty concerning its economic well-
being.  In fact, from 2007 to 2010 China experienced a high level of export uncertainty.  From 
2007-2008 exports rose from $1.38 trillion to $1.62 trillion, but decreased from 2008 -2009 with 
exports totaling $1.35 trillion a loss of two years of growth. However, Chinas exports increased 
to $1.75 trillion in 2010, a total gain of $370 billion over four years (UN Comtrade 2015).  As a 
result of economic uncertainty the Chinese fear capital flight which could divert resources away 
from development and reduce the effect of monetary policy.  This uncertainty could contribute to 
negative outcomes if China attempts to liberalize its markets too quickly.  Therefore, with the 
changing nature of the global economy, uncertainty will continue to be a problem for China to 
overcome (Cheung and Qian 2010). 
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 Zhao and Liu (2010) further the argument that China must constantly change its policy as 
its interdependence with the rest of the world evolves as well.  Shifting economic policy often 
involves a transformation in diplomatic policy as well.  In fact, ties with the United States have 
evolved over the last thirty years prompting an adjustment in Chinese economic policy as it sees 
new economic concerns.  Also, former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson stated, “the 
challenge for Washington is to understand China’s perception of self-interest, identify 
opportunities to persuade China that its interest and those of the United States are often the same 
and narrow the real differences whenever possible” (Paulson 2010, 90).  China has joined the 
WTO, and the ASEAN-China free trade agreement, signed the U.S.-China Strategic Economic 
Dialogue, signed a $400 billion gas deal with Russia, and has agreed to numerous UN 
conventions.  However, even though China has opened up to the outside in a number of ways, its 
economy is still at risk for global shocks. In 2010, China launched a stimulus program of roughly 
$586 billion intended to encourage its then slowing economy which would provide infrastructure 
investment (Zhao and Liu 2010).  With China increasing its interdependence with the rest of the 
world, some scholars such as Wang (2003) and Womack (2013) will argue their monetary and 
exchange rate policies should not be viewed as harmful to other countries, but rather as a 
mutually cooperative venture.   
 This literature discusses China as a cooperative international player in the global system.  
Although China is known to devalue its currency, its policy prescription is not to cause harm to 
other nations at the expense of its well-earned prestige.  If China’s currency manipulation solves 
a variety of domestic problems, then China devalues its currency for domestic concerns and 
government legitimacy.  These cases identified by the literature make the question of why would 
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China pursue a devaluation policy as suggested by its domestic economic concerns and political 
welfare.   
4.2 China as a harmful presence to the global system  
 Although China’s actions derive its source from political not economic logic in keeping 
with its benevolent great power, some scholars still believe China’s devaluation harms the global 
economy.  It is suggested that U.S. policy makers purposefully describe China as a harmful 
manipulator of its currency. 
 In fact, Ramirez (2012) points out some U.S. Congress members get higher political 
campaign contributions from mentioning China as a manipulator of currency.  This “currency 
bashing” as he calls it has become more salient throughout Congress in the last decade.  
Congress blames China’s currency manipulation for the loss of US jobs and competitiveness.  
PAC contributions to Congress members have some effect in shaping legislative voting behavior 
as some interest groups are positively impacted by a low RMB, and there are those who benefit 
from a high RMB.  When Ramirez tested for PAC contributions influencing how much a 
member of congress bashed currency manipulation, he found an additional $5000 in PAC 
contributions would increase bashing by 1.35, and therefore, PAC contributions are associated 
with higher levels of Congressional China bashing (Ramirez 2012).  Ramirez also tested to see if 
“currency manipulation” bashing changes the nominal RMB/$ exchange rate.  His findings 
indicate that bashing slows down rather than accelerates the rate at which the RMB appreciates 
against the dollar.  The result suggests that bashing China may actually be counterproductive.  
This article summarizes the effect that interest groups have in encouraging certain legislation that 
would bring economic benefits to their members.   
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 These interest groups in America consist of manufacturing and export servicing firms 
who wish to increase their profitability and state businesses who engage in international trade.  
This thought is important to how China may respond with its currency policy.  If China knows 
the US or other countries will respond in a negative way, then it may limit the extent of a 
devaluation or increase the likelihood of a revaluation.  Even President Obama stated in 2008, 
argued China’s trade surplus reflects its currency value (Staiger and Sykes 2010).   However, 
Goldstein and Lardy (2007) point out that debates around China’s currency manipulation began 
around 2005, when China announced a new currency exchange rate policy of a managed float.  
Conversely Mundell (2004) believes China does not have a correct exchange rate equilibrium 
and should not have to appreciate because its current fixed exchange rate policy has been the 
cause of enormous economic growth.  Too much of an appreciation could lead to a negative 
outcome. 
 The U.S. realizing this negative effect of currency manipulation by other countries has 
sought to seek reform in its domestic trade policy.  The U.S. Senate introduced the Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2013 to challenge currency manipulators.  This bill if 
passed would allow the Treasury Secretary to analyze the exchange rates of foreign countries, 
determine if a currency is misaligned, and devise a course of set policies if the country continues 
this misaligned currency strategy.  Of course these bills are nothing new to Congress, as it has 
tried numerous attempts in the past to legislate change in the Chinese exchange rate.  Hufbauer 
and Brunel (2007) explain former Treasury Secretaries John Snow and Henry Paulson have met 
with Chinese officials to convince Beijing a flexible exchange rate not only benefits China and 
the United States, but the world economy as well.  In 2007, the U.S. Congress began to consider 
bills that would affect US-China trade: the Ryan-Hunter (House): Currency Reform for Fair 
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Trade Act of 2007 (HR 2942), Schumer-Grassley-Graham-Baucus (Senate Finance): Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007 (S 1607), and Dodd-Shelby (Senate Banking): 
Currency Reform and Financial Market Access Act of 2007 (S 1677).   
 Other studies such as Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) and Gagnon (2012) find China as one 
of the biggest currency manipulators that has the greatest effect on world trade.  Also, China has 
built up the largest amount of foreign reserves; by 2014 it had reached the four trillion dollar 
mark.  China regularly purchased one billion dollars per day from 2008 to 2011 and “halted 
Renminbi appreciation between 2008 and 2010” (Bergsten and Gagnon 2012, 5). However, 
Cohen (2008), understands the stock piling of reserves by Beijing as a means of increasing its 
influence in foreign affairs or threaten the stability of the dollar.  If China were to use its reserves 
to threaten the dollar any deprecation would impose costs on China.  Cohen (2010) claims, “For 
every 10 percent depreciation of the greenback, therefore, China would lose something in excess 
of 3 percent of GDP.” (Cohen 2010, 462)   The value of Chinese reserves would decline as well.  
Overall, this form of currency manipulation will end up costing China more than doing any good 
and should not be feared by the global community.  Nair and Sinnakkannu (2010) find from 
2005 to 2009 the People’s Bank of China strongly intervened via exchange reserves to keep the 
RMB undervalued compared to other major currencies such as the USD and EUR.  In fact, a de-
pegging of the RMB in 2005 did not change the effects seen by U.S. policy makers in lost 
production and unemployment rate.   
 One interesting aspect of the Nair and Sinnakkannu study finds China’s exports evolved 
from low technology products such as clothing to high technology manufactures such as 
computers.  This shift has given China a competitive position in the global market.  A major 
concern of industrial powers is that China will continue to move toward an export oriented 
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economy of high technology equipment which has been the traditional export of Western 
economies (Van Assche et al. 2008). 
 Also, during the East Asian Financial Crisis China proved to be an economically peaceful 
country and an aid to the global economic system.  During the crisis, there were many structural 
weaknesses within the Asian economies at the time.  These countries could not effectively 
respond to capital flights, the financial sectors did not grow along with economic performance 
and excessive government involvement and corruption contributed to a growing breakdown of 
capital flows in East Asia.  These problems were further worsened by poor policy decisions that 
made the Chinese government slow in any response to a crisis (Noland et al. 1998).  China had 
been relatively unaffected by the crisis; however, at early stages of the crisis China had two 
options: devalue or not devalue.  Noland perfectly explains: “The Chinese officials knew a 
devaluation would cause another round of competitive devaluations” (Noland et al. 1998, 28).  
Therefore, China had to develop alternative tools for macroeconomic management.  Wang 
(2003) also claims China sought to act like a responsible power and that intangible concept led to 
a no devaluation strategy.  Finally, Bahamani et al. (2013), find that countries which engage in a 
devaluation technique to improve their overall trade position find the policy is less effective and, 
in fact, the countries should consider other macroeconomic policies.   
4.3 Chinese Unemployment Complications 
 According to the research discussed in Chapter two, three important factors of Chinese 
currency policy are established.  First, it has been the growth of bureaucrats concerns such as 
inflation and unemployment, but these officials will act with respect to the rest of the world 
when deciding policy prescriptions.  Second, China feels a devaluation strategy would best suit 
its economic needs and without threat of international law it is free to pursue the best 
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prescription for its needs. Finally, although the US claims China is an extreme manipulator of 
currency, no formal legislation has been brought against China.  
 The Chinese experienced political and social change during and after the 2007-2008 
crisis.  The Chinese launched a massive stimulus program which consisted of large scale 
infrastructure projects and numerous incentives to increase consumption and investment in the 
economy as a whole.  The main problem faced by the Chinese government was the massive 
influx of workers from the rural areas to the cities, drawn by the prospects of higher wages and 
opportunities, which China has encouraged over the past decades.  Migrant unemployment 
became a significant political issue in China because the factories were employing fewer workers 
to maintain their competitive advantage over foreign firms.  Since many migrants couldn't find 
work, many returned home.  Therefore, the state focused efforts on relieving employment 
pressures on returning migrants and stemming the long tide of labor outflows from rural to cities.  
The government improved rural job training and education, with an emphasis on developing 
township and villages enterprises.  The estimates of labor outflows between cities and towns 
have been as high as 130 million migrants. 
 These unemployed (or under-employed) migrant workers created social instability.  In   
some places the workers rioted because they had lower wages and hours, and the employment 
prospects were more diminished than they had anticipated.  These riot groups were met with 
brutal police repression since the government fears these protests will undermine its authority.  
However, these riots forced the state to start re-employment projects which consisted of a range 
of programs such as effective job training and placement centers.  The major union in China, the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), became heavily involved and expanded its 
services beyond union member to urban and rural areas who were not members.  Also the state 
49 
 
and the ACFTU emphasized workers’ rights.  This is seen in non-state owned enterprises and 
firms from US and Japan.  The Chinese government has sided with the workers on many issues.  
Due to state protection, China has been insulated from the damaging forces of the 2007-2008 
recession (Hurst & Sorace 2011). 
 There are some initial studies that contribute to an overall understanding of the problems 
of Chinese unemployment.  Wu (2003) shows unemployment has been an issue in China 
empirically claiming provincial and youth joblessness are higher than aggregate unemployment.  
Also, the Western provinces have the highest unemployment rates compared to total 
unemployment rate.  Wu (2003) points out the state and collective sector of the economy tolerate 
prolonged regional joblessness as it relies on the private sector to cure the out of work people in 
China.  The growth of the private sector in China has acted to reduce prolonged unemployment.  
Rosefielde (2011) claims China’s currency policy implicitly subsidizes export goods to the US 
and EU.  This viewpoint is furthered by the government’s stockpile of precautionary currency 
reserves.  This policy allows for government control of its foreign trade and will allow it to better 
project future projects, employment opportunities, and growth. 
 These fears by the government were realized during the 2008 financial crisis.  Many 
migrants moved to the cities in search of higher incomes and increased social mobility.  
However, in 2009 the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture announced twenty million migrants had 
lost their jobs.  Chinese media focused on the newly jobless migrant workers which led to rioting 
and violent incidents.  Hurst and Sorace (2011) finds the recession affected the migrants more 
than workers in state owned enterprises.  The state owned enterprise remains under the control of 
the Communist Party and its labor unions can better manage rather than represent worker’s 
grievances regarding working conditions and pay.  Overall the general feel of worker’s 
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dissatisfaction elicited state responses by the Chinese government to halt the rise in 
unemployment.  These responses were in the form of re-employment projects for laid off 
workers in state-owned enterprises and the government manipulated its currency to keep a 
competitive exchange rate in its exports to allow for a rapid re-employment of workers. 
 Inflation fears have plagued Chinese officials since the reforms of the 1970s.  Huang et 
al. (2010) claim inflation contributed to political instability in 1988, 1989, 1994, 2004, 2007, and 
again in 2010, making inflation a heavily debated policy issue.  Huang et al. (2010) provide a 
number of factors that determine China’s inflation rate.  Their variables included: excess 
liquidity, output gap, asset prices (housing and stock prices), and policy instruments (interest 
rates and exchange rate).  They advised the central bank to monitor these four areas to mitigate 
the risk of spillovers that would lead to inflation. Chow (1987) argued the monetary policy of 
China causes rampant inflation in China.  Nevertheless, it is important to know that inflation 
plays a big part in China’s central bank policy making process.  In fact China knows its past 
history with unrest and will not repeat its past mistakes by following a policy that would damage 
its people.  Furthermore, the fact that Beijing has partnered with its unemployed citizens to 
provide better job training shows the responsiveness of the government in dealing with pressing 
matters; inflation in China is a pressing issue. 
4.4 International Law 
The legal texts of the IMF and WTO provide little recourse against a country accused of 
currency manipulation.  A state’s control of its currency has been seen since the inception of 
international organizations as a sovereign right.  Therefore, any attempts to regulate a country's 
currency regime is a challenge to international law.  Barack Obama and George Bush each have 
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met with Chinese officials about exchange rate politics; however, each president was careful not 
to publically claim that China was in violation of IMF rules.   
Currency manipulation as it relates to international law operates within a system of 
anarchy.  There isn’t a higher power that enforces the supporting or prevention of manipulation, 
nor does it provide a prescription to aid in response to this policy.  Currency manipulation laws 
fall under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, more specifically under Article IV “Obligations 
Regarding Exchange Arrangements.” (International Monetary Fund 2015).  Section I (iii), 
requires all members to maintain stable exchange rates and each member, “Avoid manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance-of-
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other member countries.”  
Also, under Article IV, Section III (a) and (b), the IMF is directed to: Oversee the international 
monetary system and ensures its effective operation, also it oversees that each member complies 
with their obligations Section 1.  The Fund exercises rigorous observation over the exchange rate 
policies of its members and creates specific principles for each member to follow. Furthermore, 
each member must provide the Fund with any information regarding its exchange rate for 
surveillance purposes, and, “when requested by Art. IV, Sec. 2–3IV. Obligations Regarding 
Exchange Arrangements the Fund, shall consult with it on the member’s exchange rate policies” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015).  
Also all principles implemented by the Fund shall be “consistent with cooperative 
arrangements by which members maintain the value their currencies in relation to the value of 
the currency or currencies of other members, as well as with other exchange arrangements of a 
member’s choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and Section 1 of this Article” 
(International Monetary Fund 2015).  The principles agreed to by members will respect “the 
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domestic social and political policies of members, and in applying these principles the Fund shall 
pay due regard to the circumstances of members” (International Monetary Fund 2015). 
 Article IV clearly places important obligations and restrictions relating to exchange rate 
polices.  Members must avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 
in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members and the IMF must oversee 
the compliance of each member with this obligation and it exercises firm surveillance over the 
exchange rate policies of members.  It seems under these rules currency manipulation doesn’t 
exist as the IMF would force the country to cease such action.  However, the IMF lacks any 
enforcement power to perform such action.  Furthermore, it is well known that China 
manipulates its currency without any restraint. 
 The World Trade Organization dispute settlement system provides one of the most 
effective tribunals for trade disputes (Jung 2012).  The WTO has compulsory jurisdiction over all 
its member trade relations and the automatic adoption of its panel or the Appellate Body 
decisions.  Therefore a currency manipulation case brought before the WTO would end such 
action, as with the IMF rules. However, only Article XV GATT explicitly addresses exchange 
rate arrangements and exchange action, but not exchange policies.   According to Article XV, 
also known as the frustration article, members cannot use exchange rates to frustrate (violate) the 
intents of any provision in GATT or frustrate the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF. 
Staiger and Sykes (2010) viewed currency manipulation as it relates to the laws GATT 
incorporated into World Trade Organization law and IMF agreements.  They find the IMF and 
WTO never intended to stop nations from pursuing macroeconomic and development policies 
that were beneficial to all nations.  However, the question remain: do if China’s policies violate 
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the WTO and IMF rules which depend on the Beijing’s motivation for currency manipulation as 
a policy for increased exports or for macroeconomic development?  Essentially, there is no 
difference between the two policies China would argue it pursues. The IMF finds that states 
engage in exchange rate intervention for numerous reasons and the crucial argument to this rests 
on how other governments respond to intervention.  If a currency maintains an undervalued and 
overvalued rate, it will have effects that remain reliant on a variety of considerations.  It is highly 
misleading as Staiger and Sykes (2010) claim to equate currency undervaluation to the effects 
“in isolation of tariff increases and export subsidies”.  Staiger and Sykes provides an overview to 
the WTO laws and IMF agreements in answering questions related to China’s perceived 
currency manipulation.  However, these authors seem to forget that China isn’t the only currency 
manipulator, but that there are numerous countries they could easily fit this analysis of currency 
manipulation as it applies to international law.   
 However, Jung (2012) points out in articles 1 and 2(1) of the 1974 Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, that the United Nations General Assembly resolved every state 
exercises sovereignty over its natural capital, resources, and wealth.  Consequently monetary 
sovereignty is also included and states have enjoyed the exclusive right to regulate their own use 
and value of currency.  The concept of a national currency, which includes, money that is distinct 
and exclusive to the territory of a state, constitutes the formation of a modern nation state.  
Money consists of three faces today: a symbol of national independence, integration, and identity 
(Herrmann, 2010).  Although a state has an inherent right to control the value of its currency, this 
right can be waived by accepting an international obligation limiting its inherent rights.  
Examples of this are; joining a trading or economic bloc with a single currency such as the Euro, 
and, accepting another nation’s currency as its own, called dollarization, which is seen in South 
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America and in North Africa with the Euro.  However, with the "relatively short history of 
international economic law, only rudimentary level of customary law has been developed in the 
field of international economic relations and most multilateral economic obligations are proved 
under the treaty laws of the IMF and WTO" (Jung 2012).   
 Herrmann claims that public international law has maintained a general acceptance of the 
state power over money.  Through a decision by the Permanent Court of international Justice in 
1929, that a generally accepted principle derived from this jus cudendae monetae (the right to 
coin money) is of key legal significance and the lex monetae" (the state chooses what currency to 
use) (Herrmann, 2010).  This right of monetary sovereignty doesn't only include the right to coin 
money or what currency to use, but rather affords the state complete monetary sovereignty to 
choose from a number of policy tools between exchange rate manipulation to controlling capital 
flows. 
4.5 IMF Law 
 The purpose of the IMF includes promoting exchange rate stability, maintaining orderly 
exchange rate arrangements among members, and avoiding competitive exchange depreciation 
Art. 1 (iii).  This is an explicit and hard prohibition of exchange rate manipulation.  According to 
this provision each member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international 
monetary system  in order to prevent the effects of a balance of payments adjustments to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage over other members (Art (4) sec 1 (iii).  This system law is 
complicated by Article 4 Sec 1 (ii) which obliges members to seek to promote stability by 
fostering a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions (Herrmann 2010).  
The question becomes when does an intervention by a monetary authority go from legal and 
legitimate policy to illegal and illegitimate manipulation?  The IMF has never found even a 
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single member to be in breach of Article (4) sec 1(iii).  To show a member is in breach of Art 
4:1(iii) is not only complex but politically delicate.  Article 4:1(iii) requires showing that 
exchange rate manipulation has been undertaken with the motivation to gain an unfair advantage 
over a member.  This key provisions renders the IMF code of conduct essentially defective 
(Zimmerman 2014).  Although the IMF Agreement is the most important and probably the only 
source of international law directly restricting a state's monetary sovereignty, the IMF does not 
possess an effective tribunal to adjudicate the alleged violation of the IMF Agreement by its 
member states.   
4.6 IMF Surveillance 
 Art. 4 Sec. 3 (a) of the Articles of Agreement maintains the IMF to "oversee the 
international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation and the compliance of 
each member with its obligation under Section 1 of this Article.  Paragraph (b) empowers the 
IMF to exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of its members and to adopt 
specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies (Herrmann, 
2010).  It is on this basis the IMF established, in 1977, its bilateral surveillance mechanism, 
which underwent reforms in 2007 in a broad effort to maintain international monetary stability 
(Zimmerman 2011).   The IMF has adopted the following principles for its bilateral surveillance 
mechanism in order to guide members on how to conduct exchange rate policies.  First, a 
member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system.  Second, 
a member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter disorderly conditions, 
which can disrupt short term movements.  Third, members should take into account their 
inventionist policies and the interest of other members whose currencies they intervene.  Finally, 
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a member should avoid exchange rate policies that result in external instability (Zimmerman, 
2011).  This surveillance mechanism merely restates IMF Article 4:1 (iii).   
 However if a member is found to be in violation of these principles that would require 
looking at the annex which repeats a member is in violation if it secures a misaligned exchange 
rate, determined by the IMF, and this misalignment increases net exports.  Nevertheless the IMF 
gives most nations the benefit of the doubt.  Herrmann, found that China’s exchange rate policy 
violates most of the principles, but under the IMF rules it would fail the test required by Art 4:1 
(iii).  The IMF believes most nations, China in particular, may have a greater set of reasons for 
its exchange rate policy than export expansion and the macroeconomic effects of its exchange 
rate policy are more complicated than presumed, and Art 4:3 (b) the IMF directs the mechanism 
to have due regard to possible domestic policy choices by the state in question (Herrmann 2010). 
 Even though the IMF has guidelines in place to find currency manipulation, it rarely does 
because it gives states the benefit of the doubt.  It is no surprise that the IMF has not found any 
nation to have violated of Art4:1 (iii).  Even if it did declare a nation in violation, without a 
dispute mechanism there is no way for the IMF to curtail the nation’s current policy.  The IMF's 
only resources are to suspend their voting rights, expel a nation from the IMF, or use peer 
pressure to force the nation back into alignment. 
4.7 Summary of Literature 
 The literature lays out salient points regarding Chinese economic and political policies.  
China does not seem to manipulate its currency relying the usual economic justifications 
concerning trade advantages, but rather more political points of prestige and legitimacy of its 
government.  However, it does not explain why China manipulates its currency.  If China does 
not follow economic logic then what factors are left? These factors could include: 
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unemployment, inflation, government prestige which encompasses its power in the UN and other 
international committees, asset prices, modernization, and the lack of an international legal 





Chapter 5. Methodology 
 
 This chapter provides the methodology of the thesis.  First, the created equation to test for 
currency manipulations effect on modernization is introduced.  Then the variables are introduced 
followed by an explanation of their equations.  Finally, the variables are described and related to 
the overall thesis. 
 From the literature review it was quite evident that scholars cannot find an answer to why 
China performs currency manipulation.  However, it seems that Beijing performs such actions 
for three reasons: to rapidly modernize its economy, to assist in mitigating the spillover effects of 
modernization such as unemployment, and lastly to increase the amount of overall investment 
received from foreign actors to ameliorate the imbalances of rapid growth in a few sectors of its 
economy.   
5.1 Model 
 I argue China manipulates its currency to receive advantages in six areas which creates an 
equation as currency manipulation is a function of: (i) Net Development Assistance Received 
(NDAR), (ii) increases in trade exports (Trade), (iii) a reduction in unemployment 
(Unemployment), (iv) increases in manufacturing (Manufacturing), (v) inflation reduction 
(Inflation), and (vi) an increase in Gross National Income (GNI).  The relationship expressed in 
equation defines the connection: 
Manipulation = f ( NDAR, TRADE, UNEMPLOYMENT, MANUFACTURING, INFLATION, 
GNI). 
 To understand the equation in theoretical terms, as China manipulates its currency, it 
should expect to see increases in foreign investment because a manipulated currency is usually 
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pegged to the dollar within a narrow band, making profits of international companies easier to 
forecast, thereby reducing risk.  Also, as the value of currency decreases in value compared to 
the reserve currency, any amount of aid will increase the overall amount of aid given to China 
NADR.  Included in the NADR are net official inflows from UN agencies as well.  For example, 
if China’s currency falls in value and the UN gives more aid in dollars to China, the country 
receives more currency for investment all else being equal.  As investment increases in China 
there should be a relative increase in the levels of national income and trade exports.  This in turn 
decreases unemployment as workers find jobs in manufacturing plants which increases the 
exports of merchandise goods.   
5.2 Explanation of Variables 
 First an explanation of each variable before the empirical investigation in the next section 
is necessary.  Some of the cases mentioned in the theoretical equation were combined to bring 
depth to the analysis.  
 First, the Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received in current U.S. dollars.  
Which consists of Net ODA disbursements of loans made on concessional terms, repayment of 
loan, and grants made by the agencies of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
multilateral institutions, and non-DAC counties to promote economic growth and development. 
The data is shown in table 4 (appendix). 
 Also included in Net ODA comes Net official flows from UN agencies in U.S. dollars.  
Total Official Flows are the sum of ODA or other official flows (OOF) and represents the total 
disbursements by the official sector at large to the recipient country.  There are three main 
classes of transactions included here: official export credits, official sector equity and portfolio 
investment, and debt reorganizing undertaken by the official sector on non-concessional terms.  
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The UN agencies included in the analysis are the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Regular Programme for Technical Assistance 
(UNTA), and the World Food Programme (WFP).  The data is in currency U.S. dollars and 
found in table 5 (appendix). 
 Second, merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and 
imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. 
 Third, unemployment as a percent of labor force under national estimate.  This refers to 
the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
 Fourth, the percent of value added to the manufacturing sector, as a percent of GDP.  
Which is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
 Finally, GNI per capita is the gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI 
(formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in the current local 
currency.  For a complete list of the data set see the appendix for Table-Macroeconomic Factors 







Chapter 6. Empirical Analysis 
 
 This study does not seek to provide a compressive analysis for all the determinants of 
China’s currency manipulation.  Rather it investigates the connection among ten particular 
variables.  It uses conventional theory testing methodology to examine the relationship among 
these variables at the macro level.  The data was received from the World Bank Data Catalogue 
of development indicators (World Bank 2015).  All the variables are measured annually from 
1981-2011. 
 Before testing the equation an examination of logical soundness for analyzing the effects 
of international law on Chinese currency manipulation warrants a discussion.  Referring back to 
the research question, China manipulates its currency because no international structure prevents 
it from doing so.  When China began to modernize its economy it did so under an international 
system that had recently broken free from an international monetary standard under the Bretton 
Woods agreement. Also, during the 1970s-1980s other countries especially the Europeans found 
it difficult to make concessions for other countries to grow economically.  There was a tradeoff 
between job winners and job losers, and China had to maintain a job winner status.  Alongside 
this development of job competition the international community started to deal with fluctuating 
exchange rates and external shocks from the commodity market, which made adhering to 
international norms difficult to achieve.  The fall of Bretton Woods triggered a response against 
inflation and unemployment as countries struggled to find solutions.  The Philips curve explains 
the tradeoff many countries including China had to face when emerging from the Bretton Woods 
era.  Most countries responded by following a supply side economy also known as monetarism 
whereby central bank intervention will cure the economic ills of unemployment and inflation 
without the need for government intervention. 
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 The tradeoff means that countries can see high inflation with low employment or high 
employment with high inflation.  China knowing this had to make the trade off, but could not 
decide between the two as both have caused unrest in the past and led to changes in its 
modernization potential.  Beijing knew it would come under scrutiny from currency 
manipulation because it developed under an international system with regimes that consisted of 
the WTO, IMF, World Bank, UN, and the end of the Cold War.  China followed suit with the 
rest of the world agreeing to the UN, IMF, and WTO.  It is quite obvious China followed a form 
monetarism policy which included inflation, unemployment, and growth as parts of that policy.   
 Although China signed on to many agreements to not manipulate its exchange rates under 
the IMF and WTO, it still followed its version of monetary policy that manipulated exchange 
rates in the face of economic law.  International economic law governs two main areas: the 
economic relations among states and regulating international trade among states.  For example, 
how a state chooses to regulate its financial sector or its interest rates, resides with the state even 
if it may have negative effects on others.  Also, international economic law tries to establish 
common standards and rules which can include the environment and human rights.  Attention is 
given to the already mentioned areas of GATT, WTO, IMF, and Bretton Woods.  Normally most 
areas of law focus on the GATT/WTO areas.  One major development of international economic 
law that the international community has learned from the 2008 recession was that leaving 
economic regulation to the individual states and market forces generates too much risk and has 
now shown the serious implications the global economy will face during a crisis. 
 China understands its welfare is closely tied with the rest of the world and took 
precautions to mitigate the damages felt from external economic and currency shocks.  Pegging 
its currency to the dollar allowed for a stable currency regime and a safer reserve to invest in 
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than other assets; the acceptability of the dollar globally allows for China to prepare itself against 
crises.  Normally, developing countries are at a greater risk to encounter financial crisis and 
pegging its currency is a reasonable defense.  The other reason for China pegging its currency to 
the dollar and the effects of doing so are outlined and mentioned in the previous sections, 
repeating them again here seems redundant.  China pegging its currency to the dollar is not 
considered per se illegal by any standard.  Also, China setting an inflation target of 2.1 percent is 
not per se illegal as well.  Currently about seventy members of the IMF have adopted pegging its 
currency to other exchange rates, see table-7 Monetary Policy Framework in the appendix for a 
detailed list.  In fact, the majority of members in the IMF have adopted some form of currency 
manipulation to best suit each member’s needs.  The Monetary Policy Framework table Shows 
126 members of the IMF maintain some form of currency manipulation against the U.S. dollar, 
Euro, or composite amount. 
 Finally, analyzing the intent of China’s currency manipulation demonstrations how 
international law cannot even dictate its policy. A key provision of Article XV must find 
evidence if the actions of China frustrate the intent of GATT and IMF provisions, which means 
China must have the motivation to manipulate its currency in order to harm another nation.  
What many countries, especially the United States complain about, is not the peg China 
maintains, but rather it is the prolonged form of a peg to the U.S. dollar.  Determining the intent 
of such action is hard to accomplish without the knowledge of China’s leaders intentions.  Some 
countries would argue the intent of China’s action constitutes a subsidy, as an undervalued 
exchange rate would impose a theoretical tax upon an importer and a subsidy to an exporter.  
However, this argument does not make sense as the factories that employee the workers do not 
make products from Chinese companies, but rather foreign companies.  Also, without an 
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effective enforcement mechanism it seems as if the IMF articles of agreement encourage 
currency manipulation. 
6.1 Regression 
 Using hypothesis testing I determine if currency manipulation is employed to influence 
other areas of the Chinese economy.  I predicted in my theoretical analysis that China relies upon 
manipulation to propel it toward a modernized economy.  To accomplish this it must seek 
investment and aid, raise incomes, and increase trade exports.  A regression analysis seeks to 
explain a relationship between variables.  Here I seek to find the relationship between the annual 
changes in China’s exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar and the effects on aid, 
unemployment, national income, and trade.  The summary is found in table 2 and the actual 
results are found in the appendix. 
Table 2 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
NODA 1.115 3.004 2.092 0.048* 
UNDP -6.235 2.453 3.713 0.001** 
UNFPA -1.557 4.018 -2.540 0.019* 
UNHCR 1.425 9.454 -3.876 0.000** 
UNICEF 9.984 4.607 1.507 0.146 
TRADE 0.035 0.016 2.167 0.041* 
UN 0.860 0.346 2.110 0.046* 
MANVALUE -0.302 0.144 2.484 0.021* 
GNI -3.653 1.863 -2.099 0.063 





 As table-2 shows currency manipulation accounts for 96 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variables.  Of the nine variables tested, only two proved not to be statistically 
significant: UNICEF and gross national income.  At the .05 level, net official development 
assistance, UNFPA, trade as a percent of GDP, unemployment rate, and the value added by 
manufacturing were all significant.  At the .01 level UNDP and UNHCR were significant.  The 
results were not surprising given the logical soundness of the theoretical framework; however the 
direction needs an explanation. 
 The main problem lies in the effects of modernization on exchange rate level which is a 
limitation that will be discussed shortly.  First, as China manipulates its currency it moves 
toward a devaluation policy from 1981-2005, but begins to appreciate in a narrow fixed band.  
Of course, the purpose of this study was to analyze currency manipulate to the present date 
where data is available, 2011.  Along with that fact, it would make sense that as China revalues 
its currency it would receive less overall aid, but UN aid still arrives to solve a number of 
specific issues.  As China propels itself on a modernization track the overall amount of aid would 
decrease over time; however this empirically proves that currency manipulation is tied directly to 
currency values.  Second, as China manipulates its currency we expect its overall exports as a 
percentage of GDP to increase as they devalue and decrease as the currency appreciates.  Again 
this is shown here were devaluation adds only a marginal benefit to its overall exports.  Also the 
level value manufacturing adds to GDP should begin to decrease as China reassesses its currency 
situation.   
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 The unemployment rate needs further analysis.  It can best be explained by understanding 
that modernization fuels migration which then in turn leads to more people becoming 
unemployed as they actively search for work in the cites, but cannot find any.  Also even if 
China furthered devalued its currency the effect on employment would not be noticed as it seems 
if China might be in the transition between industrial society and modern society.  Finally, gross 
national income turned out as expected.  As the exchange rate decreases, there should be an 
inverse effect on wages.  For China to revalue its currency, GNI must maintain a steady increase, 
or otherwise it would jeopardize the gains made in its economy.  Therefore as China begins to 
revalue its currency gross national income increases as people find higher level jobs other than 
manufacturing and agriculture.  In fact, to prove this explanation, running correlations from 
1981-2004 show how devaluations in the Chinese RMB led to increases in aid, income, and 
trade.  Table 3 shows this result. 












Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 My thesis contends that China purses currency manipulation as one of its many policy 
tools in order to achieve rapid modernization.  However, while modernizing its economy China 
encountered a number of problems such as inflation, unemployment, and migration.  Currency 
manipulation helps to alleviate these problems associated with modernization.  Also, China is 
able to accomplish this form of policy prescription because no higher force prevents it from 
continuing this policy.  My model results support the argument about Chinese modernization and 
supports the contention that currency manipulation is an aspect of Chinese development policy.   
 Developments in China’s economic history from 1840-1980 have pushed toward a rapid 
modernization approach that stresses outside investment to develop its infrastructure in China’s 
rural and urban areas.  This finding concurs with others such as Womack (2013), Wang (2003), 
and Zhao and Liu (2010) who find China has aspirations to become a responsible great modern 
power and must change its policies as its interdependence with the rest of the world changes as 
well.  Conversely most work including Bergsten and Gagnon (2012), Herrmann (2010), and 
Gagnon (2012) on Chinese monetary policy accuse China of only pursuing currency 
manipulation in order to gain trade advantages.  However, I prove that China has manipulated its 
currency for a number of reasons that do not concern trade advantages.      
 This research does provide a framework for future studies.  By adding more variables 
such as one for political legitimacy and international law cases, I will then be able to empirically 
prove my point without the need for a section on logical soundness.  Also, this framework could 
apply to other countries as well and even develop a theory to understand modernization in Asia 
by currency manipulation.  Also, reviving the theory of modernization will allow for new studies 
in developing countries that can focus on other areas such as the environment, social change, and 
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education.   It would also be interesting to apply this model to developed nations like the United 
States, Great Briton, and France to see if they historically followed the same path of 
development or if China is a deviant case. 
 However, there are some limitations from this case study.  The most critical case against 
my study would argue that currency manipulation is a monocausal variable and one explanation 
would not lead China on the rapid path of modernization while at the same time alleviating 
domestic problems.  This critique is correct, however, I do not make mention that currency 
manipulation alone will solve China’s problems and provide a stable path for economic growth, 
rather I take into account that currency manipulation was one of many policy tools China used 
for modernization.  Furthermore, this study places a heavy emphasis on Sino-American relations 
and it does neglect the influence of other countries who are affected by China’s currency 
manipulation such as Turkey and some European Union members.  Further investigation into 
these cases will reveal a greater insight into how China’s currency manipulation affects more 
than the United States.  Finally this study does not determine if the modernization effects from 
Chinese currency manipulation solely benefit China, or if this model of growth can be exported 
to other countries.  I will argue on this point that China’s unique makeup of a different civil 
society that stresses the benefit of community coupled with its communist government and 
quasi-socialist/capitalist tendencies may only be a model for China.  In other countries the civil 
societies would not allow a country to follow a currency policy that would bring down the 
country’s prestige or affect different interest groups such as business coalitions that relied on 
imports.  However, further investigation is needed to create an argument for this critique and it 
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Table 4 Macroeconomic Factors 
Date FDI % of GDP GDP Trade % of 
GDP 
Unemployment Inflation 
1981 0.211634 2.48E+11 15.12309 3.2 -0.21056 
1982 0.278393 2.75E+11 14.54509 2.3 1.04317 
1983 0.488676 3.17E+11 17.25997 1.9 4.958204 
1984 0.540976 3.6E+11 22.44794 1.8 10.23799 
1985 0.629551 3.91E+11 22.43189 2 4.703154 
1986 0.855856 4.37E+11 24.09179 2 5.17414 
1987 1.03191 4.86E+11 23.72492 2 12.10178 
1988 0.986412 5.06E+11 22.28936 2.6 8.549073 
1989 0.976922 5.25E+11 26.67145 2.5 5.798718 
1990 1.150556 5.73E+11 29.3718 2.3 6.869863 
1991 2.63947 6.55E+11 31.26536 2.3 8.19881 
1992 6.246294 7.47E+11 30.15261 2.6 15.1574 
1993 6.041763 8.44E+11 41.21632 2.8 20.62781 
1994 4.92429 9.37E+11 38.81082 2.9 13.7108 
1995 4.693461 1.03E+12 38.05745 3 6.427061 
1996 4.643558 1.13E+12 39.01268 3.1 1.515712 
1997 4.291577 1.21E+12 36.3927 3.1 -0.88891 
1998 3.577381 1.31E+12 37.96687 3.1 -1.27325 
1999 3.204014 1.42E+12 44.24362 3.1 2.032721 
2000 3.33943 1.53E+12 43.0802 3.6 2.052582 
2001 3.391597 1.67E+12 47.69501 4 0.600733 
2002 3.0139 1.84E+12 56.93216 4.3 2.587877 
2003 3.215294 2.03E+12 65.51084 4.2 6.927345 
2004 4.92756 2.26E+12 68.63965 4.2 3.920381 
2005 4.912457 2.54E+12 70.56824 4.1 3.807164 
2006 4.847943 2.9E+12 68.01186 4 7.637415 
2007 4.131019 3.18E+12 62.27481 4.2 7.763764 
2008 3.347956 3.48E+12 49.02122 4.3 -0.60627 
2009 4.603093 3.84E+12 55.04069 4.1 6.63872 
2010 4.528771 4.2E+12 54.59919 4.1 7.804669 
2011 3.592271 4.52E+12 51.82407 4.1 1.995158 

















1981 3036000000 37.1259 528.4843   
1982 836000000 36.37514 584.9207   
1983 -1271000000 35.28787 698.6475   
1984 -14902000000 34.73166 860.1706   
1985 -11962000000 34.97848 963.1117   
1986 -3779000000 34.45449 1111.644   
1987 -7752000000 34.60293 1364.961   
1988 -6604000000 34.30442 1519.771   
1989 8746000000 32.6592 1648.923   
1990 8119000000 32.48726 1896.644   
1991 4355000000 32.73655 2312.272   
1992 -12215000000 33.97007 2992.093   
1993 5391000000 33.62806 4036.503   
1994 16696000000 33.654 4964.127   
1995 12215000000 33.5117 5760.954   
1996 40422000000 33.18285 6346.024   
1997 43475000000 31.84114 6685.079   
1998 29232000000 31.59165 7062.879   
1999 24109000000 32.11893 7761.523   
2000 22545000000 31.63581 8496.93   
2001 30426000000 31.41512 9301.443   
2002 25468000000 32.84855 10476.33   
2003 32097000000 32.36743 12302.81   
2004 1.02E+11 32.50721 14084.11   
2005 1.77517E+11 32.92101 16468.43   
2006 2.6434E+11 32.90503 20215.88   
2007 2.98126E+11 32.65117 23857.56   
2008 1.95689E+11 32.30202 25563.75   
2009 1.81507E+11 32.45849 29883.98   
2010 1.54897E+11 31.83172 34859.9   









Table 6 Development Aid 
DATE 






















1981 475900000 400000 15540000 15520000 9490000 2480000 
1982 523380000 3450000 18300000 11030000 10930000 4070000 
1983 668800000 2980000 20660000 9150000 6530000 6130000 
1984 797480000 10330000 15370000 5650000 4130000 5160000 
1985 938750000 19710000 14420000 11670000 3600000 6660000 
1986 1095220000 22960000 17330000 9150000 4750000 16730000 
1987 1377940000 32980000 27720000 9560000 4640000 16960000 
1988 1919060000 10710000 31240000 12010000 4000000 14490000 
1989 2070830000 6730000 30560000 13060000 4110000 16700000 
1990 2032370000 17490000 39830000 4580000 4080000 14640000 
1991 1932580000 13700000 35760000 13560000 7580000 16080000 
1992 2993630000 12480000 35480000 10410000 4070000 21850000 
1993 3206880000 14210000 30760000 10320000 3230000 17650000 
1994 3138610000 10810000 25170000 6720000 2520000 22490000 
1995 3470670000 10320000 28860000 7750000 2650000 20030000 
1996 2640040000 17940000 22430000 0 3000000 18340000 
1997 2047390000 26470000 26760000 50000 3030000 18750000 
1998 2438570000 12670000 14380000 1330000 2810000 17500000 
1999 2379250000 12690000 15540000 5460000 2070000 14790000 
2000 1711750000 6550000 12730000 3500000 1650000 18100000 
2001 1549030000 11230000 8880000 3630000 2090000 12530000 
2002 1496780000 3830000 9650000 4570000 2720000 11360000 
2003 1358550000 4360000 8600000 4870000 2810000 12020000 
2004 1715750000 5500000 8960000 4640000 0 12340000 
2005 1814300000 11750000 9350000 4510000 1480000 14390000 
2006 1247870000 14670000 8460000 3650000 260000 11140000 
2007 1487940000 26790000 9820000 4140000 9490000 13330000 
2008 1479510000 11390000 7740000 6500000 10930000 11960000 
2009 1129470000 15720000 7680000 3570000 6530000 10540000 
2010 646110000 13710000 6260000 3440000 4130000 11000000 






Table 5 Development Aid Continued 
DATE 
UNTA in current 
U.S. Dollars 
WFP in current 
U.S. Dollars 
   
1981 1230000 6910000    
1982 800000 15370000    
1983 3000000 24950000    
1984 1620000 79680000    
1985 4540000 67880000    
1986 3180000 84510000    
1987 5420000 86470000    
1988 2580000 101460000    
1989 5510000 23940000    
1990 6590000 8650000    
1991 4730000 21620000    
1992 3990000 28120000    
1993 6750000 23780000    
1994 3190000 24850000    
1995 10830000 21210000    
1996 4110000 16300000    
1997 6330000 18890000    
1998 3890000 10490000    
1999 6320000 6500000    
2000 5460000 7530000    
2001 7040000 10990000    
2002 5700000 12060000    
2003 6800000 10790000    
2004 6100000 6340000    
2005 8910000 8000000    
2006 4380000 0    
2007 7790000 0    
2008 2170000 0    
2009 0 0    
2010 0 0    






         SUMMARY OUTPUT 
        
          Regression Statistics 
        Multiple R 0.980549499 
        R Square 0.961477321 
        Adjusted R 
Square 0.944967601 
        Standard Error 0.560402239 
        Observations 31 
        
          ANOVA 
           df SS MS F Significance F 
    Regression 9 164.6044516 18.28938352 58.23704682 7.84971E-13 
    Residual 21 6.595064049 0.314050669 
      Total 30 171.1995157       
    
            Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
 Intercept 10.82630546 5.174870698 2.092091976 0.048759958 0.064572716 21.58803821 0.064572716 21.58803821 
 C 1.11591E-09 3.00495E-10 3.713571479 0.001285967 4.90996E-10 1.74082E-09 4.90996E-10 1.74082E-09 
 E -6.23521E-08 2.45397E-08 -2.540871915 0.019017359 -1.13385E-07 -1.13191E-08 -1.13385E-07 -1.13191E-08 
 F -1.5578E-07 4.01882E-08 -3.876252206 0.00087301 -2.39356E-07 -7.22037E-08 -2.39356E-07 -7.22037E-08 
 G 1.42511E-07 9.45468E-08 1.507305901 0.146629102 -5.41099E-08 3.39132E-07 -5.41099E-08 3.39132E-07 
 H 9.98485E-08 4.60716E-08 2.167244444 0.041860278 4.03728E-09 1.9566E-07 4.03728E-09 1.9566E-07 
 L 0.035729329 0.016930487 2.110354497 0.046994961 0.000520454 0.070938203 0.000520454 0.070938203 
 M 0.860587629 0.346369771 2.484592193 0.02148078 0.140272258 1.580903001 0.140272258 1.580903001 
 N -0.302982719 0.144328134 -2.099263047 0.048059907 -0.603129505 -0.002835933 -0.603129505 -0.002835933 
 Q -3.65321E-05 1.8638E-05 -1.960090802 0.063388387 -7.52919E-05 2.22767E-06 -7.52919E-05 2.22767E-06 
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Table 7 Monetary Policy Framework 
 Monetary Policy Framework-Source: International Monetary Fund, April 1, 2015   





U.S. dollar (44) Euro (27) Composite 
(13) 




















   
Currency 
board (12) 
ECCU Antigua and 
Barbuda Dominica 
Grenada St. Kitts and 
Nevis St. Lucia St. 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines Djibouti 






   
Conventional 
peg (45) 
Aruba The Bahamas 
Bahrain Barbados 
Cape Verde Comoros 









Belize Curaçao and 
Sint Maarten Eritrea 
Jordan Oman Qatar 
Saudi Arabia South 
Sudan Turkmenistan 
United Arab Emirates 
Venezuela 
Tomé and Príncipe 
WAEMU Benin Burkina 
Faso Côte d’Ivoire 
Guinea-Bissau Mali 
Niger Senegal Togo 
CAEMC Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
















Macedonia Vietnam  Congo, Dem. 











































Liberia  Algeria Iran 
Syria 
Vanuatu 
 Bangladesh 
Burundi 
Guinea Kyrgyz 
Rep. Malawi 
Nigeria 
Paraguay Belarus 
Malaysia 
Mauritania 
Myanmar 
Russia Sudan 
Switzerland 
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